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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the extent to which the politioal 
mechanism succeeds in providing public goods so that this supply 
reflects consumer preferences. In a world of private goods^ a 
competitive market would theoretically ensure an optimal supply of 
each good. But with the introduction of public goods^ the very 
nature of these goods prevents the market from achieving this 
optimal supply. 
A Pareto optimal solution would require that consumers he 
charged according to their marginal evaluations of each public good. 
Those with higher evaluations should pay more, \ihilst there exists 
the possibility of cost shares being determined in this way, rational 
consumers will disguise their preferences. 
Charges for goods supplied by local councils (local public goods) 
are determined in a different way. Cost shares are fixed ex-ante and 
are immutable. Under these circumstances consumers have no incentive 
to disguise preferences. It is therefore hypothesised that the supply 
of local public goods will be closely related to consumer preferences.^ 
^Other reasons for believing this to be so are outlined in the 
body of the paper. 
Empirical stiidies designed to reveal preferences for local public 
goods are described^ and the results tend to support the hypothesis. 
A comparison is made of the preference patterns which exist in 
the City of Wollongong and the Municipality of Shellharhour. Some 
possible determinants of demand for local public goods are also con-
sidered. 
CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
1. IntroduoHon 
Several writevs have pointed out that Anglo-American economists 
have until fairly recent times paid scant attention to the expend-
iture side of public finance. ^ To some extent, this deficiency has 
been overcome by the efforts of writers such as Samuelson^ Musgrave, 
Head and Buchanan. The very magnitude of expenditures undertaken by 
public authorities illustrates that the area is worthy of careful 
study. 
e.g. In Australia^ expenditures by public authorities account for more 
than 30% of Gross National Product. The percentage of these expend-
itures for which local government authorities are responsible is 
decreasing, although in absolute terms these expenditures have steadily 
increased to more than $900 million per annum. These trends are ill-
p 
ustrated in Table 1-1. 
^P.A. Samuelson, "Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories," Review 
of Economics and Statistics^ 1968, 322-38. 
J. G. Head, The Theory of Public Goods. Paper delivered to the 
Conference on Economic Policy, Uni. of Queensland, August 1967. 
2 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, National Accounting Estimates 
of Public Authorities Receipts and Expenditures. (Canberra, ACT). 
Supplement to the Treasury Information Bulletin, December 1971. 
TABLE 1-1 
Austvalian Public Authorities Eo:penditure 
Year Total Public G.N. P. Total Public Local Govt. Local Govt. 
Authority Authority Expendit- Expendit-
Expenditure Expenditure ure ure as % of 
as % of G.N.P. Total Govt. 
Expenditure 
^millions ^millions ^millions 
1963-64 5244 17998 29.5 462 8.8 
1964-65 5881 19799 29. 7 499 8.5 
1965-66 6567 20851 31.5 550 8.4 
1966-67 7241 22771 31.8 588 8.1 
1967-68 7968 24187 32.9 632 7.9 
1968-69 8681 27272 31.8 681 7.8 
1969-70 9457 30106 31.4 723 7.6 
1970-71 10573 33088 31.9 843 7.9 
1971-72 11940 36486 32.7 915 7.7 
Some of these expenditures by the various authorities are sim-ply 
transfer payments^ hut a considerable proportion is made to provide 
public goods and services. 
2. The Problem 
The basic problem with which this thesis is concerned arises 
because of the different ways in which private and public goods are 
supplied. In the former case, the market works quite well. In fact, 
if certain imperfections such as monopolistic elements and undesirable 
distributions of factor endowments etc. are disregarded, then the market 
mechanism may be described as "a convenient and effective device to 
approximate the efficient result (the aohievement of the conditions 
of Pareto optimality)." 
Certain characteristics of piiblic goods preclude the market 
mechanism from operating efficiently to ensure an optional supply of 
these commodities^ and some degree of market failure can he predicted. 
Some other allocative device must therefore he found. The political 
mechanism is often used to ensure the supply of some public goods. 
These are then financed from the public budget. But Read has 
emphasised that there is no guarantee that the goverrment will he able 
to do any better than the market mechanism in ensuring optimal public 
goods supply^ and his work may be interpreted as implying a theory of 
political failure. ^ For in contrast to market supply of private goods^ 
there is the problem that individuals may be unwilling to reveal their 
true preferences for public goods. 
7 
R.A. Musgravej "Provision of Social Goods in the Market System^" 
Public Finance^ XXVI 1971 ̂  304-320. 
^R.A. Musgrave^ The Theory of Public Finance^ (New York: McGraw-
Hilh 1959), p. 8. 
^J. G. Headj op. cit. 
^J.G. Beady "Equity and Efficiency in Public Goods SupplyPublic 
Finance, XXV 1970, 24-37. 
However, there are reasons for believing that at the local 
government level the political mechanism may work quite well in 
providing public goods. These reasons will be outlined later in 
this chapter. This belief gives rise to the basic question asked in 
this thesis - "To what extent does the supply of services provided by 
local government authorities reflect consumer preferences?" 
3. Plan of the Thesis 
An important part of this thesis is concerned with empirical 
studies designed to reveal consumers' preferences for public goods. 
From these studies it is hoped to provide an answer to the problem 
posed above. The nature of these purposes appears to have determined 
the design of the exposition which follows, in which the preliminary 
conceptual study (Chapters I - I I I ) leads on to an effort to test some 
of these concepts empirically (Chapters III - V), and to elaborate a 
system which goes some way towards explaining the empirical obser-
vations (Chapter VI). 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will be concerned with 
previewing the organisation of the rest of the thesis, to assist the 
reader in grasping the relationship between the various parts of the 
work. The basic problem with which this thesis is concerned will also 
be considered in some detail. Chapter II discusses the concept of a 
purely public goodj and the main argument of this chapter is based 
y 
on the work of F.A. Samuelson and particularly J.G. Head. 
Chapter III begins with an appraisal of the relevance of the 
8 
Tiehout model under Australian conditions. Two alternative models 
of local government expenditure are developed^ and the policy 
implications of these are discussed. The remainder of the chapter 
describes a study designed to test some of these concepts empirically, 
A further empirical study is described in Chapter IV^ and some 
comparisons made between the City of Wollongong and the Municipality 
of Shellharbour. Chapter V discusses some possible determinants of 
demand for local public goods. The effects of such variables as age^ 
occupational status and nationality are examined. In the final 
chapter a more complete explanation of the empirical observations 
will be attempted, 
4, Characteristics of Public Goods 
The ideal type or polar case of a public good is the purely public 
good which Samuelson has defined as a good "which all enjoy in common 
n 
J,G, Headj op, cit, 
^C,M. Tiehout^ "A I 
of Political Economy^ LXIV (February-December^ 1956)^ 416-424 
o 
, b j Pure Theory of Local Eccpenditures^" The Journal 
in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads 
to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that 
9 * 
good. " Put differently^ if x^ represents the quantity of the good 
which can he consumed by individual tj and X represents the total 
production^ then the good is purely public if x^ = X for all 
individuals i. Each person*s consumption of the good is equal to 
every other person's and equal to the total produced. 
Public goods may he distinguished by two characteristics -
jointness of supply and difficulty of exclusion. ^^ In the extreme 
case of the purely public goodj these characteristics would he present 
in absolute quantities^ so that difficulty of exclusion could he re-
written as impossibility of exclusion. It is the presence of these 
characteristics which prevents the market mechanism from operating 
effectively. 
g 
P.A. Samuelsonj "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditure^ " Review of Economics and Statistics^ XXXVII^ No. 4 
(November^ 1965)^ 350-56. 
^^J. G. Head^ "The Theory of Public Goods^ " op. cit. 
The meaning attached to the term here is quite different from that 
used by Alfred Marshall. For Marshall^ jointness of supply arose 
because of technological cojvdxtions of producing. 
e.g. A producer who raises sheep is ahle to jointly supply both wool 
and mutton. Thus, an individual*s demand curve for sheep would he 
determined hy adding vertically his demand curves for wool and for 
mutton. This is discussed in J.M. Buchanan^ The Demand and Supply of 
Public Goods. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. y 1968)^ p. 34. 
Jointness of supvlii 
Although the two characteristics listed above are discussed in 
some detail in Chapter 11^ it would seem useful at this point to 
describe them briefly, as they give rise to the problem with which 
the thesis is involved. Jointness of supply as used here refers to 
the fact that public goods are not used up in the process of con--
sumption by any one individual - they are capable of being consumed 
equally by all. Put differentlyy every person's consumption must be 
equal to the total quantity of the service supplied. 
The supply of air pollution control may be used as an example 
to illustrate this point. If air pollution control is provided, 
then the service is jointly supplied to all consumers. 
Jointness of supply is due to technological conditions of con-
suming. Once a service imit of the good is made available to one 
individual, a service unit of the same quality can be made availcxble 
to all other individuals at no extra cost. Since each consumer must 
consume the same amount of the service, then vertical summation of 
individual demand curves is necessary to obtain a market or total 
demand curve. 
i. e. Total demand is determined by calculating what each person would 
pay for the same amount of the good. 
e.g. Figure 1-1 illustrates how the total demand curve for a public 
service such as air pollution control would be determined. D^, D^ 
and D are the demand curves for individuals A^ B and C respectively. 
The vertical sum of these three demand curves is shown as the total 
demand curve. 
Determination of Total Demand for a Tuhlio Good 
f\G l-l 
W i l l i n g n e s s io p a y ^or 
Air Poliu4ion Conirol. 
Cosi per Unif 
JoisI Demand 
Quanhiy of S e r v / c e 
received by eny 
Individjfll Consumer. 
Impossibility of exclusion 
Head sees this quality as being the extreme case of external 
economies. ̂ ^ It simply means that once a service unit of a good 
is made available to one consumer^ it not only can but must be made 
available to all other consumers. 
e.g. In the air pollution control example used above^ all consumers 
benefit from the service once it is supplied^ even if they choose 
not to contribute to the cost of the service. In Chapter 11, it 
will be explained in greater detail why this is the most important 
cause of market failure. But it is obvious that if non-purchasers 
are not excluded from the use of a service, then market demand curves 
will understate social benefits and production will be below its 
optimal level. The extent of the distortion will depend upon the 
number of units each individual receives free of charge and the number 
12 
of individuals involved. 
5. Political Provision of Public Goods 
It was mentioned above that public provision may be deemed necessary 
when market failure occurs. Ideally, this should be designed to pro-
12 
vide a mechanism which corrects for private market failures. 
^^J.G. Bead, "The Theory of Public Goods," oy. cit. 
^^A.L. Ginsburg, "Public Provision, Jointness and Efficiency," 
Public Finance, XXV (1970), 465-86. 
^^Ibid. , p. 466. 
Government ooeroion will require that everyone^ through the payment 
of taxes^ oontrihutes to the cost of supplying public goods. These 
taxes may he viewed as a price for such goods. 
If the government is to lead the economy towards a situation of 
Pareto optimality^ then the taxes must he designed to maximise the 
satisfaction that each consumer derives from his payments for public 
and private goods.^^ This involves the simultaneous determination of 
public goods supply and cost sharing, Lindahl analysed how this 
might he done in a model involving a single public good and two tax-
payers,^^ This simplified model assumes two taxpayers^ A and B^ and 
a public good whose supply bestows benefits to both A and B, The two 
individuals must contribute enough to cover the total cost of whatever 
volime of the public good is supplied. 
Individuallyy each will have to pay less as the other contributes 
more, B's offer to contribute certain percentages of the total cost 
of various amounts of the public good may be interpreted from A. 's 
point of view, as a supply schedule of the public good; and A*s offer 
may be interpreted in a similar manner by B, This situation is 
depicted in Figure 1-2, 
Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance^ op.cit: p. 73, 
^^As cited by Musgravej Ibid.j pp. 73-78, 
Lindohl*s Simultaneous Determination of Output and 
Cost Shares 
U QIC 
Units of Social Goods. 
On the left vertical axis is measured the percentage of total 
cost contributed by A^ and on the right vertical axis is measured 
the percentage contributed by B, The curve is A's demand 
schedule^ price being measured as a percentage of cost. Taxpayer A 
is willing to pay 100% for output OG^ 50% for OC and so on. The 
curve ^^ ̂  similar demand schedule for B, He is willing to 
contribute 100% for output OU^ which amount is available free to A. 
The equilibrium output occurs at OE, where a^a^ and b^bj intersect^ 
and both shares add up to 100%. Here, A contributes ED, and B con-
tributes DE per cent. In equilibrium, each taxpayer consumes the 
same quantity of the public good at a price which reflects his 
evaluation of the good. This is compatible with Samuelson's normative 
theory of public goods presented in Chapter II. 
But it is quite obvious that Lindahl pricing is not possible, 
since information about consumer preferences to determine cost shar-
ing arrangements would lead to a disguising of preferences. As Head 
puts it, " individuals have an incentive to disguise their true 
preferences for public goods in an attempt to obtain a more favourable 
16 
tax price or cost sharing arrangement. " 
^^J.G. Head, "Equity and Efficiency in Tublic Goods Supply," 
op. cit: p. 32. 
Supply by local government authorities 
It was stated ^previoiisly that there are reasons for believing 
that local government bodies may adequately perform the task of 
providing public goods so that the supply reflects consumer prefer-
ences. These reasons will now be e3::p>lained. 
(i) Provided that tax prices are rigidly set in advance^ no 
individual is able to obtain a more favourable tax price or cost 
sharing arrangement by strategic conceahnent of his true preferences. 
In New South \^aleSy a person's cost share depends upon the Unimproved 
Capital Value of his property. Cost shares are therefore fixed ex ante^ 
and the burden of financing public goods cannot be shifted onto par-
ticular groups or individuals. Under these circumstances^ consumers 
are far more likely to make their preferences known to the relevant 
public authority. 
(ii) Related to this point is the often advanced argument that local 
goverrment bodies are far more fleo:ible in adapting to the changing 
needs of the people they represent. 
There are -therefore a priori reasons for believing that a mech-
anism may exist at the local government level whereby consumers are 
supplied with services so üiat this supply reflects consumer preferences, 
CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF PUBLIC GOODS 
Two of the foremost contributors to the literature oonoemed 
with public expenditure are Samuelson and Head. The exposition 
below closely follows some of their main arguments^^ and the chapter 
is divided into three distinct sections. 
a) The normative theory of public goods in which the requirements 
for optimal provision of a public good are derived, 
b) The theory of market failure. It will be shown that the character-
istics of public goods are such that no decentralised market system 
can be eocpected to satisfy these requirements. 
c) Provision of public goods through the political mechanism. The 
argument will be advanced that even though government coercion may he 
necessary to ensure that supply of a public good is forthcoming, there 
J. G. Head, ''The Theory of Public Goods, " op.cit. 
P.A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI (1954), 387-89. 
P.A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of Theory of Public 
Expendit24re," Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVII (1955), 
350-56. 
is no convincing a priori argument which suggests that the political 
mechanism will improve upon the performance of a decentralised market 
system in ensuring optimal provision of the good. 
1. The ¡Normative Theory of Public Goods 
Samuelson has outlined the necessary marginal conditions for 
the allocation of resources to public goods supply. 
He observed that economic theory progresses from extreme cases^ 
and his model uses a purely public good X^ ccnd a purely private good 
Xj" Following Samuelson and Head, the analysis commences with 
preference functions for two individuals^ A and B. The indifference 
maps relating goods X^ and X^ for A and B are shown in Figures 2-1 
and 2-2 respectively. The different slopes for the indifference 
curves for A and B indicate that the two individuals have different 
assessments of the relative merits of the private and public good. 
Figure 2-3 depicts a production possibility locus^ CD^ showing 
transformation possibilities between X^ and X^. As stated earlier^ 
each person's consumption of the public good X^ is identically equal 
^P.A. Samuelsony "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure^" 
op. pit. 
^P.A. Samuelson^ "Diagrarrmatic Exposition of a Pure Theory of 
Public Expenditure^" op. cit. 
to the total produced. Once the output of the puhlio good in 
Figure 2-2, or the consumption of either person in Figures 2-J or 
2-2 is fixed, the horizontal position in the other diagrams is 
fixed at the same level, 
Samuelson then derives a set of Pareto optimal points or a 
utility possibility locus. Each Pareto point shows maximum 
(ordinal) utility for A for given levels of utility for B. To derive 
one such point, B's utility is held at the level represented hy in-
difference curve U^. The highest indifference curve which can he 
reached hy A must now he calculated. This will obviously he a Pareto 
optimal point, since as A has reached his highest possible indifference 
curve (-with the constraint that B's utility level is held constant at 
U^^), then neither can he made better off (reach a higher utility level) 
without making the other worse off. 
Indifference Map for Individual A 
riG 2-\ 
Indifference Map for Individual B 
Fie 2 - 2 
X 
Production Possibility Frontier for a Public 
and Private Good 
FIG 2 - 3 
0 
i/^ is plotted on Figure 2-3 and subtraoted vertically from CD 
to obtain the quantities of X^ and X^ which can he made available to 
A consistent with holding B on indifference curve i/^. The vertical 
difference between CD and i/^ is plotted as cui*ve cd on Figure 2-1. 
This curve can be regarded as a consumption possibilities curve for 
A. 
A is best off at E^ where cd is tangent to one of his indiffer-
ence curves. Once A^s preferred consumption of the public good is 
determined at E^^ B must consume at the corresponding point E^j and 
the production point E can be marked on CD of Figure 2-3. An 
algebraic exposition of the derivation of this Pareto optimal point 
may be helpful at this point. 
MRS^y A = A's marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
between X and Y = the slope of A's indifference curves 
MRSy^ B = B's marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
AX 
between X and Y = the slope of B's indifference curves 
1 1 
U^j U2 etc. 
MT = the marginal rate of transformation between X and Y = the 
slope of CD. 
Then CD - U^^ = ' ^^^XY ^ = ^^ 
At E^j where cd is tangent to U^ 
cd^U^ 
i. e. MT - mS^y B = MRS^y A 
MRS^y A + MRS^y B = MT which is the tangency condition. 
Other Pareto optimal points could he derived in the same way 
by setting B's utility at a higher or lower leoel^ obtaining the 
corresponding lower or higher opportunity curve for A^ and finding 
the indifference curve for A which is tangent to it. Figure 2-4 
indicates these utility possibilities on an ordinal diagram. The 
utility frontier of Pareto optimal points is given by PP. A's 
utility is measured on the vertical axis and B's utility on the 
horizontal axis. Although all are optimal points^ it is not possible 
to move from one point to another on PP without lowering the utility 
of either A or B. 
Determination of '^Optimum Opttmorion" Using 
Social Welfare Function 
F I G l - A 
Orc/md! Mhre 
of B 
A movement down the oupve from left to right increases B's 
utility at A*s expense. What criteria^ then^ are to he used to 
determine how resources will he allocated between production of 
public and private goods? 
Some writers have expressed dissatisfaction with Samuelson for 
taking the analysis heyond the point of establishing the necessary 
ma:rginal conditions. As Buchanan points out, "The search for a 
unique solution is misleading since the multiplicity of optima is a 
characteristic of all interaction processes where gains-from-trade 
are possible."^ Similarly^ in arguing that Sanmelson should restrict 
his analysis to the allocative aspects (specifying the necessary 
requirements). Head describes the "new optimum conditions" as being 
a "muddle of misplaced concreteness in the treatment of the distribut-
ional aspects, 
Nevertheless, Samuelson defines the optimum optimorum, the best 
of the Pareto optima, even though many such optima are possible. The 
criterion for determining governmental activities can be expressed 
only in terms of the preferences of society, as consolidated into the 
social welfare function - "the function expressing the composite 
Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, op. cit,, 
p. 196. 
^J.G. Head, "The Theory of Public Goods," op. cit, , pp. 5"6. 
relative preference schedules for various patterns of resource 
allocation and income distribution," 
Samuelson determines a "unique state of the world" where a 
social welfare contour touches the utility possibility locus. This 
is shown by point g in Figure 2-4. 
2. Market Failure in Public Goods Supply 
It can be shown that no decentralised market system can be 
eo::pected to satisfy the requirements outlined above. Following Head, 
an example is used with two individuals A and B, two commodities X 
n 
and Y, and two factors K and L. The following three conditions are 
then individually necessary and collectively sufficient for the 
achievement of a Pareto optimum. 
(i) An exchange condition, requiring that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution in consumption between the two commodities should be the 
same for both individuals, 
i. e. MRS^yA = MRS^^B . 
^John F. Due, Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector, 
(Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968) pp. 6-7. 
^J.G. Head, "The Welfare Foundations of Public Finance Theory," 
Rivista di Riritto Finanziario & Scienza delle Finanze, XXIV (1965), 
pp. 16-17. 
(ii) A production condition^ requiring that the marginal rate of 
substitution in production between the two factors should he the 
same for both commodities, 
i. e. MRS^ X = MRS^ Y . 
(Hi) An overall condition^ requiring that the common marginal rate 
of substitution in consumption between the two corrmodities should 
equal the marginal rate of transformation between them, 
i. e. MRS^^ a = MRS^y B = MT^^ . 
A perfectly competitive market with no external economies or 
diseconomies would theoretically ensure that these conditions were 
realised. With the introduction of a purely public goody the overall 
condition now required is equality between the marginal rate of trans-
formation and the sum of the marginal rates of substitution, 
i. e. MRS^y A -h MRS^y B = MT^^ . 
With this change in the optimal conditions^ it is no longer 
possible to achieve a Fareto optimum through the decentralised pricing 
system of a competitive world. In a world of private goods^ the over-
all condition ^^^^ ^ ~ ^^XY ^ ~ ^ ^^ achieved because A and B are 
able to vary their purchases of X and Y in accordance with their personal 
demand schedules for the corrmodities. 
Since the same amount of a public good must (by definition) be made 
available to all consumers^ then differential prices must be charged to 
individual consumers for the overall condition above to be satisfied. 
Individuals with higher marginal evaluations should pay more. But a 
competitive market system is not capable of generating a set of prices 
which discriminates between consumers, hence it can be predicted that 
the market will fail to satisfy the necessary optional conditions. 
Market failure can be attributed to two related but quite distinct 
characteristics of public goods, namely noint supply and imyossibility 
of exclusion* 
Joint supply 
This quality means that public goods are not used up in the pro-
cess of consumption by any one individual - they are capable of being 
consumed equally by all. Thus, once a unit of the service is made 
available to one individual, a service unit of the same quality can 
be made available to other individuals at no extra cost. In other 
words, the marginal cost of providing an additional service unit is 
zero. 
e.g. If air pollution control is provided for some people, then its 
benefits can be made available to all. 
But if it is assumed that a price can be charged for the service, 
then it is this characteristic of joint supply which brings about the 
important change in the necessary optimal conditions. Each person's 
consumption of the purely public good must be the same and equal to 
the total produced. But marginal evaluations of the goods will vary. 
and differential pricing would he necessary to bring about a con-
dition of Pareto optimality. Consumers must be brought into utility 
maximising satisfaction at the same level of consumption. It would 
also be necessary for individuals with a negative evaluation of the 
public good to be compensated. 
e. g. Burglars would need to be compensated to offset their negative 
evaluation of law enforcement services. 
Having demonstrated that differential prices which a competitive 
market could not generate are necessary^ Head then discusses the 
possibility of a producer having a legal monopoly being able to achieve 
a Pareto optimum.^ If this producer was a profit maximiser y then he 
would discriminate between consumers in so far as prices are concerned. 
Such a pricing policy would achieve the desired result. Discrimination 
would be conceptually possible since retrading of the services enjoyed 
by different consumers would not be possible because of the nature of 
public goods. 
But for practical purposes^ the possibility of price discrimination 
breaks down because of the informational demands placed on the monopol-
isty who would need to acquire full knowledge of the preference maps 
of all potential consumers. The rational consumer would understate or 
disguise his marginal evaluation of the good. 
^J. G. Heady "The Theory of Public Goods, " op. cit. 
Impossibility of exclusion 
It was stated above that once a service unit of a public good 
is made available^ then a service unit of similar quality can be 
made available to all other consumers. Even if the services can be 
withheld from those who do not pay^ the joint supply characteristic 
requires a set of differential prices to be generated for Pareto 
optimal supply of the good. No competitive market system can satisfy 
these requirements* 
But the second important characteristic^ impossibility of ex-
clusion is a far more potent cause of market failure^ because the 
services associated with the supply of a public good cannot be with-
held from those who do not pay. 
i.e. Not only can a service unit be made available to all other con-
sumers once it is made available to one individual. It must be made 
available to all others. 
e.g. If the air pollution control referred to above is made available 
to one individual9 then full and equal consumption by all consumers is 
not merely a necessary condition for Pareto optimality. It is a logical 
consequence arising from the nature of the service. 
The two characteristics described above, while frequently assoc-
iatedj are quite distinct. Bead points out that one characteristic 
Q 
can be present without the other. 
^Ibid., p. 
e.g. The oonstruotion of a bridge gives rise to jointly supplied 
services hut exclusion is possible. On the other handy if gold is 
discovered^ problems of exclusion are encountered although the gold 
has no characteristics of jointness. 
But it is emphasised again that impossibility of exclusion is 
the more important factor causing market failure. As Musgrave puts 
ity "People who do not pay for the services cannot be excluded from 
the benefits that result^ and since they cannot be excluded from the 
benefitsy they will not engage in voluntary payments. Hence the 
market cannot satisfy such wants. 
In other words^ if no part of the service can be held from non 
paying consumers^ then the competitive market will produce nothing. 
Monopolies 
In so far as the joint supply characteristic is concerned, it 
was shown that a legal monopoly would improve on a competitive market's 
performance, provided that the information problem was disregarded. 
But once account is taken of the second essential characteristic, 
impossibility of exclusion, then it is obvious that even a monopoly 
will produce little or nothing of such a good. Once a unit is made 
^^R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, op. cit., p. 8. 
'ZI ' 
ccoailahle to one consumer^ it automatically becomes available to all 
others free of charge. 
Head draws attention to a third and less obvious characteristic 
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of -public goods. This quality was implied in the burglar example 
above. The services of the public good not only can and must be 
fully and equally available to all^ they must actually be consumed 
fully and equally by all^ including those who would choose not to do 
so, even at a zero price. This characteristic is referred to as 
impossibiliti^ of rejection, and the exarr^le is given of a Quaker*s 
attitude towards national defence. This concept can be ignored if 
the public good concept is restricted to services which provide 
utility and not disutility over the relevant ranges for all individuals. 
It would seem helpful at this stage to show diagrammatically how 
the two important characteristics, jointness of supply and impossibil-
ity of exclusion distinguish a public good from a private good. 
Figure 2-5 shows the utility possibility frontier for a fixed output 
1 2 12 
of a good X and two individuals, U and U . 
^^J.G. Head, "The Theory of Public Goods," oy.cit., p. 12. 
^^Adapted from W. H. Oakland, "Joint Goods," Economica, XXXVI 
(August, 1969), 253-268. 
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Utility Possibility Frontier for a Public and Private Good 
FIG 2 - 5 
Individual I's utility 
If the good is public, the consumption of each individual is 
equal to total output, X, and their utilities are given by Ip- (X) 
2 
and U (X), The utility possibility frontier is shown by 
(X) if exclusion is possible, or simply the point A if 
exclusion is impossible. If the good is private, the consumption of 
each man obeys the equation 
^X - J a ^ j; i, j = 1, 2) . 
Since the individual's utility depends only upon the amount of 
the good allocated to him, the utility frontier will be non-positively 1 2 
sloped and will assume a form such as U (X) U (X) in Figure 2-6. For 
private goods, a negative slope is the only restriction that is placed 
on the utility frontier. It should be noted that the frontier for the 
public good lies entirely to the north-east of that for the private 
good, reflecting the fact that public goods permit of joint consumption 
whereas private goods do not. 
The yroblem of larae numbers 
To focus attention on the crucial role of large numbers. Head 
IS 
next considers his analysis in a more general framework. So far the 
discussion has been restricted to competitive markets and legal mon-
opolies, which are considered to be simply special cases of "large 
^^J.G. Head, "The Theory of Public Goods, " op. cit., pp. 15-17. 
number voluntarist'Cc systems of market type agreements," These 
have already been shown to he unable to generate or enforce the set 
of differential marginal prices swrming to marginal cost as required 
for a Vareto optimal result. The performance of a general large 
number voluntatis tic system is now considered, 
Wicksell recognised that such a system could not even approx-
imate Pareto optimal provision of public goods. He stated that 
If the individual is to spend his money for private 
and public uses so that his satisfaction is maximised^ 
he will obviously pay nothing whatsoever for public 
purposes 
Whether he pays much or little will affect the scope 
of public services so slightly^ that for all practical 
purposes he himself will not notice it at all,'^^ 
Every individual reasons that he may ignore the reactions of 
others to his own possible antisocial behaviour. Optimal results 
for him are obtained if he allows others to supply the public good 
while he enjoys a "free ride"; that is^ secures the benefits without 
contributing to the cost. Each individual sees his actions as being 
imperceptible in relation to the total. 
However^ where the numbers are small, the contribution of others 
to projects is no longer likely to be independent of each individual^s 
^^Ibid., p. 15. 
^^Cited by Head. Ibid,, p. IS, 
contribution. Strategio behaviour will he engaged in by eaoh unit 
in an attempt to minimise its own contribution and exi^ract maximum 
net benefit from the process. This behaviour would include masking 
preferences and transmitting false signals. 
Strategic behaviour in small numbers 
It can be shown that where small numbers are involved and inter-
dependent behaviour is taken account of^ Pareto optimal gains are 
possible. Following Buchanan^ it is proposed to examine the implic-
ations of a model based on an island economy in which 
a) individuals act independently^ and 
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b) co-operative behaviour is employed. 
For simplicity^ it is assumed initially that the only persons 
involved^ A and Bj are identical with respect to productive capacity 
and tastes. The gathering of coconuts constitutes production of the 
private good. Coconuts are available to both A and B upon a specific 
outlay of time spent in gathering them^ and the outlay per coconut 
gathered remains constant over the relevant quantities. Mosquito 
destruction is the public good (service) and this is purely public to 
the two individuals. 
^^J.M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, op. cit. 
pp. 11-22. 
i.e. The elimination of one mosquito benefits each man simultaneously^ 
and is thus available to each man in equal quantities. Specific 
quantities of mosquito destruction can he secured by certain outlays 
of time on the part of either person^ and once again^ the cost per 
unit of output is assumed to remain constant over relevant quantities. 
(a) Independent adjustment 
Both A and B will consider the destruction of mosquitoes along 
with the gathering of coconuts. Under the conditions assumed^ {similar 
tastesy equal productive capacity^ constant returns) there will be no 
incentive to engage in trade. Each man will proceed to reach a wholly 
private equilibrium position without trading with the other. Thus^ 
the initial equilibrium position sought will be equivalent to that 
which would be attained in a one-person world. 
Each man^s preferences for the two goods can be depicted on an 
orthodox indifference map derived from a standard utility function. In 
Figure 2-6^ units of the public good are measured along the vertical 
axis and units of the private good along the horizontal axis. The 
individual*s opportunities to gather coconuts or destroy mosquitoes are 
summarised by the transformation function PP^ which because of the 
previously defined simplifying assumptions is linear. 
The individual will initially try to attain position Ey where one 
of his family of indifference curves is tangential to PP. He will fail 
- Z7 -
to reach this point because of the nature of the public good, which 
means that the activities of A and B will necessarily he interdepend-
ent. In attempting to reach E, the person will actually reach F, 
because his counterpart will be undertaking an equivalent outlay on 
mosquito destruction. Instead of the quantity OP of the public good 
being available to the individual, it is in fact possible for him to 
enjoy OF , precisely double OF, Obviously this must be so since the 
public good or service is equally available to A and B, irrespective 
of which individual produces the good or service. 
F is not a position of final equilibrium, except under the 
restrictive condition where the income elasticity of demand for the 
private good is zero. At position F, the individual will consider it 
advantageous to change his plans, Ee will consider the newly-found 
increase in the public good available to him as an increase in his 
opportunities and in his real income, although the rate at which he can 
change one good for the other xHll not be modified. He will now try to 
adjust to his apparent transformation cujove P'P' which will be parallel 
to FF under the original assumptions laid down in this model. 
Acting rationally, the individual will reduce somewhat his production 
of mosquito elimination and expand his production of the private good, 
coconuts. In the extreme case where the income elasticity of the public 
good is zero, he would seek to attain an adjusted position at G, If 
both goods exhibit positive income elasticity, the sought for position 
Determination of Output of a Public and Private Good 
FIG 2-6 
will lie somewhere between F and G. For simplicity it is assumed 
that the income elasticity of the two goods is unitary. In this 
case J the sought after position will he E. 
This position will not he attained and for the same reason E was 
not attained; the activities of the two persons are interdependent. 
Adjustments will continue to take place until a position at E is 
reached, which will represent one of final equilibrium under wholly 
independent behaviour. 
A ^ 
Geometricallyy E is located where BC is equal to CE. Under the 
assumption of unitary income elasticity the equilibrium position is 
located along the ray EE U, In describing the adjustments towards a 
final equilibrium it has been assumed that the publicness of the one 
good remains wholly hidden from individuals A and B. This ensures that 
no strategic behaviour on the part of individuals A and B takes place 
in the adjustment process. A does not recognise that B's efforts pro-
vide him with benefits. Re therefore has no incentive to modify his 
own behaviour in an attempt to receive more of the external economies. 
Buchanan claims that the introduction of strategic behaviour on 
the port of one or both of the individuals yyill not change the location 
of the final equilibrium position under the conditions assumed and with 
the utility function depicted in Figure 2-6. This is guaranteed by the 
fact that the position of equilibrium, E , lies on a higher utility level 
than G, the extreme position that might be sought and potentially attained 
by one of the two individuals who behaves strategically. But it is 
i t 
obvious from Figure 2-6 that this ordinal relationship between E and 
G could in fact be reversed. If the relationship is reversed^ and 
one individual succeeds in reaching G while the other remains at E^ a 
type of nonsymmetrical equilibrium is achieved. Although the active 
strategist will not he in full marginal adjustment, he will recognise 
that some concealment of his true preferences remains advantageous, 
(b) Interdependent behaviour 
Figure 2-6 can be used to demonstrate that the independent adjust-
ment equilibrium is non optimal in the Pareto sense. This is because 
both A and B adjust to the apparent production possibility curve through 
E* parallel to PPj when in fact under joint or co-operative behaviour, 
the actual production-possibility curve faced by each person is PP . 
** 
Although the individual cannot act independently on the basis of PP , 
simulataneous action on the part of both A and B will allow each to move 
along PP**, finally attaining the optimal position E. 
' ' i t is not apparent that this guaranteed relationship does exist. 
It would appear from Figure 2-6 that the reverse is the qase. 
i.e. That G represents a higher level of utility than E. Buchanan's 
next two sentences explain this apparent anomoly. P. 14, lines 15-20. 
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Implications of the model 
The reason for outlining the simple trading model was to show 
that in the absence of the large number problem^ efficient outcomes 
will tend to emerge from voluntary-exchange processes. This will be 
so because Pare to improvements are possible. But as the number of 
economic units involved increases^ and each individual unit regards 
the effects of its own behaviour (contributions) as being relatively 
imperceptible, then the "freerider" problem will emerge. 
i. e. In terms of Figure 2-6, each rational individual will attempt to 
obtain position G. This important point may be summarised and 
emphasised by the use of quotation from Buchanan. ̂ ^ 
The simple trading models demonstrate only that efficient 
outcomes will tend to emerge in the extremely rarefied 
conditions imposed. If the number of persons is smalland 
if they behave vis-a-vis other persons as if they are in 
large number circumstances, ordinary exchange will generate 
outcomes that may be classified as optimal. The freerider 
analysis, following hard on these trading models, demonstrates 
that the extension of numbers is sufficient to eliminate the 
optimality property of predicted trading outcomes. 
^^Buchanan also presents a mathematical treatment of this aruxlysis. 
An expanded (and hopefully clarified) version of this mathematical 
exposition can be found in the appendix to this chapter. It was 
designated to an appendix so that continuity would be preserved, and 
the reason for presenting the model not obscured. 
^^Ibid., p. 199. 
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3. Political Provision of Public Goods 
The analysis above illustrates the point that where the number 
of economic units involved is small and strategic behaviour is 
possible^ then some approach towards a Pareto optimal situation could 
be expected* But for pure public goods the efficient size of the 
sharing group is infinite^ because ¿ointness of supply is complete. 
Once market failure is established^ the supply of these goods through 
the political system must be accepted as necessary. 
Only government coercion can provide the guarantee for each 
individual that others will pay their share if he pays his share. But 
because of the lack of information surrounding public goods preferences^ 
there is no guarantee that the government can do better than the market 
in providing an optimal supply of public goods. 
Head then examines some of the political decision making processes 
20 
which various authors have suggested. The problem of course^ is to 
find some technique by which individuals can be induced to reveal their 
preferences for public goods so that the public budget may be planned 
accordingly. Various voting mechanisms are described^ but Head's general 
conclusion seems to be that although some promising beginnings have been 
made^ there is an obvious need for a more general theory of constitutional 
choice. 
20 ̂
J.G. Headj "The Theory of Public Goods," op. cit. pp. 17-21. 
The discussion in the -pTeoeding two paragraphs emphasises the 
importance of the argument presented in Chapter I that consumers are 
more likely to he willing to reveal their preferences to local 
government authorities. In Chapter IIIj a description will he given 
of studies designed to encourage consumers to reveal their preferences 
for public goods supplied hy local authorities. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
An expanded and thus simplified exposition of Buchanan*s 
geometriQal analysis presented in Chapter II is outlined below. The 
airriy is to shew that where the number of eooncmic units oonoemed is 
smallj then Pareto optimal gains are possible from trade. The same 
two individuals A and B^ and the same goods X^ (the private goodj 
coconuts) and X^ (the public good^ mosquito destruction) are used. 
Ct 
The same assumptions are also made. 
A*s utility function is defined aSj 
= a/, x f . i/; (V 
where superscripts designate the person producing the goodj directly 
or indirectly* 
A ^ Thus X^ represents private goods produced by person A^ X^ 
represents the public good produced by B but enjoyed by A and X^ 
represents the public good produced by A. 
Similarlyy B's utility function may be represented as^ 
a / , x^^ x^) r i i ; 
Each man devotes a fixed amount of labour input to total goods 
production^ public and private. A and B confront a transformation 
function indicating the rate at which the private good can be converted 
into the public good^ and vice versa^ through his own behaviour. 
A's transformation function is given by, 
/ = / a / , x/ ; (in) 
and B's transformation fimction is given hy, 
F̂  = / a / , x^) . (IV) 
If A and B act independently, and no trade takes plaoe^ then 
equilibriwn will take place when (V) and (VI) (below) are attained. 
A u Y ^ ^^ Y ^ 
2 = 0 rw 
and 
A ^ ^ A Xj 
B ^ 
" B r ® 
= 0 (VI) 
B 3 
" B ^ ^B 
(V) and (VI) can he derived from the preceding equations as follows^ 
9 / 3 / ^^ written as 
A A 
" " (for A) 
^1/ 
and similarly 
U^. U B 
^ / Y / Y 
is written as 
B B u u 
^1/ 
lA 
Also 3 / „ r / y 
ri/ tz 
{for B) 





^ / r ^ / 7 is written as 
^1/ 
(for B) 
where lower oase u's and f's represent the partial derivatives of the 
utility and transformation functions respectively^ with goods noted 
in the subscripts and persons in the superscripts. 






" " A / ^ 
/ . 
^ A / . 
^•e. -3 -J = 0 (V) 
^ A 
h 
" S ^ B 
" B ^ E a:,® 
s ^ B 
xf xf 
v.e. -g - = 0 (VI) 
These will be the conditions for individual marginal adjustment. A 
and B will modify their own individual behaviours so long as the 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption differs from the marginal 
rate of transformation. 
Implications of Trade 
To examine the implications of tradej the following questions are 
posed. 
a) How will trade take place?, and 
h) What equilihriun will tend to emerge? 
From the definition of a ipublic goody a unit of X^ produced 
and consumed by A is valued by B to the same extent that he values 
a unit of his own production. The same is true of A's evaluation of 
a unit produced and consumed by B. 
Thus in the no-trade equilibrium^ A^s activity in producing the 
public good exerts a Pareto-relevant external economy on B^ whereas 
B's activity in producing the public good exerts a similar externality 
on A. Each person values the producing activity of the other at some 
value greater than zero in the no-trade equilibrium. No value will be 
placed by A or B on the other ^s production of private goods. Stating 
these conditions in algebraic terms we have: 
A A 
^ B " B 
^ = 0, . ^ > 0 (VII) 
A A 
i . u 
X. X. 
u y^ 
X- X ̂  
L. = 0, ^ > 0 (VIII) 
B ' B 
Both A and B place a positive value on the increase in public 
goods production undertaken by the other. Each will he willing to 
for^* 't^his increase by being willing to extend his own production 
for any quantity greater than zero of the public good. 
Trade will take place under such conditions and will continue 





















In conditions (IX) and (X) equilibrium in the trading situation 
is obtained. A 's marginal rate of substitution in consumption of the 
public good together with A^s marginal evaluation of B's production of 
the public good is equal to A's marginal rate of transformation between 
the two goods. This is shown by equation (X). Equation (IX) could be 
interpreted in a similar manner for B. 
Statements (IX) and (X) are flexible enough to allow any degree of 
exi^emality in X^ to he examined. Firsts suppose that X^ has mistakenly 
been labelled as purely public^ when in fact^ both A and B consider 
it to be purely private. Ilere^ the left hand side of the equations 
in (IX) and (X) become zevo^ and the no-trade position is restored. 
Trade cannot emerge under tiie restricted conditions of this example 
where A and B are identical with respect to tastes and productive 
capacities and where their production functions are constrained. 
Second^ suppose that X^ is only partly public; for example^ say 
A values his own mosquito destruction more than he does that by By 
although he places some positive valuation on the latter. Conditions 
(IX) and (X) will remain those which must he met in full trading 
equilibrium. 
Next, to take a less familiar variation^ suppose that both X^ 
and X^ are purely public. Conditions (IX) and (X) continue to define 
equilibrium in the two-person^ two-good case. 
Finally^ if it is postulated at the beginning that one of the two 
goods is purely public it becomes possible to simplify the general 
equilibrium conditions. This simplification has been assumed through-
out Chapter 2. When X^ is known to be purely public^ these necessary 
conditions (9) and (10) can be reduced to (9) alone if the assumption 
is made that only one of the two persons produces X^. Suppose B 
actually produces X^ and that A pays him through an appropriate 





A B f 
x^ 
Equation (9A) is recognised as the familiar definition of the 
conditions for public goods optimalityj as presented by Samuelson 
and others. The summed marginal rates of substitution between the 
public good and the private good is equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good and the private good. 
It is important to note that the conditions (9)^ (9A) and (10) 
haoe not been explicitly connected with optimality or efficiency 
considerations. These conditions are presented as those which allow 
definition of the characteristics of an equilibrium position which 
will tend to emerge from a txoo-person trading process. 
CHAPTER III 
PREFERENCES FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY^ 
1. The Tiehout Hypothesis 
In the previous chapter^ the discussion was ooncevned with the 
polar or exrtreme case of a public goodj the purely public good. But 
few goods can meet the demanding requirements necessary to he class-
ified as purely public goods. Yet many goods exhibit sufficient 
"publicness" (have some characteristics of jointness and also problems 
of excludability) to cause at least some degree of market failure. 
These would include education^ bridges^ roads and many others. Thus 
market failure may range from virtual collapse in the polar case y 
through serious and significant (in cases like public health and 
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education)3 to more marginal cases. 
The point of all this is that this thesis is primarily concerned 
with the provision of goods and services by local government authorities, 
This chapter is based on the paper by J. Scarletty Reconciliation 
of Demand for and Supply of Local Public Goods^ paper presented at the 
46th A. N. Z.A.A.S. Congress^ Perth - August^ 1973. 
^J.G. Heady "The Theory of Public Goods," op.cit.y p. 23. 
Many suoh goods are characterised by a considerable degree of 
tt 2 "publicness"^ but none could be classified as a purely public good. 
These goods will be referred to as local public goods. 
It has been stated that the problem with which this thesis is 
concerned arises because of the nature of public goods. These goods 
have certain characteristics which preclude the market mechanism from 
operating effectively^ so that political provision may be deemed 
necessary. The lack of information about preferences for public goods 
makes it unlikely that decision makers will be able to lead the 
economy to a Pareto optimum. 
But Tiebout has developed a model which he claims provides a 
conceptual solution to the problem. His model assumes a large number 
of communities in which consumer voters may choose to live. Given the 
expenditure and revenue patterns of these communities^ the consumer 
voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies 
2 
An outline of Breton's approach to classifying such goods is 
given in Appendix A. A description of Buchanan's theory of ''club 
goods" is also included in this appendix^ and the implications of his 
work for this thesis are considered. This section has been designated 
to an appendix so as not to interrupt the continuity between the 
theories outlined in Chapter II (and the problem highlighted by these)^ 
and the empirical study of the problem which follows. 
4 
Charles M. Tiebout^ "A Fure Theory of Local Expenditures^ " The 
Journal of Political Economy^ LXIV (February-Decerriber^ 1956)j 416-24. 
his set of preferences. There is such a wide variety of patterns of 
local goroemment services provided, that every personj by selecting 
the locality in which he lives, enjoys the services he requires in 
the desired quantities and at the price he is prepa:red to pay. 
Providing that each person is aware of the variety described 
above and the population is completely mobile, then it will not be 
necessary for the local government to adjust the expenditure pattern 
to the preference pattern of the community; rather, each person 
"votes with his feet" so that an optional solution to the problem is 
obtained. The possibility of moving to other communities presents 
the consumer with a choice, and establishes a system comparable with 
a market mechanism in local finance. 
The important point is, that if the Tiebout effect operates 
effectively, then people with similar wants lyill tend to congregate 
within the same community and a homogeneous pattern of preferences 
will be established. The task of providing a satisfactory solution to 
the problem of public goods supply will thus be greatly simplified. 
There is some empirical evidence which lends support to the 
Tiebout hypothesis. Oates reasoned that if consumers, in their choice 
of locality of residence, consider the available programme of public 
services, then it could be expected that gross rents (actual or imputed) 
and therefore property values would be higher in a community the more 
attractive its package of local government services. ^ This reasoning 
assumes J of course^ that other things (including tax rates) are equal. 
Individual familiesy desiring to consume higher levels of -public out-
putj would presumably tend to hid up property values in communities 
with high-quality programmes of public services. 
An empirical study involving a cross sectional analysis of a 
sample of fifty-three residential municipalities in northeastern 
New Jersey3 all of which a:re located within the New York metropolitan 
region^ was undertaken. Since eo::penditure on primary and secondary 
education is the largest single item in local public budgets in America^ 
Dates was concerned with the relationship between expenditure per pupil 
in public schools and local property values. 
By regression analysis he found that local property values bear 
a significant negative relationship to the effective tax rate and a 
significant positive correlation with expenditure per pupil in the 
public schools. These results are consistent with the Tiebout model in 
that rational consumers appear to weigh (to some extent) the benefits 
from local public services against the cost of their tax liability in 
choosing a community of residence. 
mllace OateSj "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public 
Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization 
and the Tiebout HypothesisJournal of Political Economy^ (November-
December^ 1969)^ pp. 957-71. 
But this evidence is not very conclusive^ since the opposite could 
also he the case. 
i. e. In high value areas councils tend to have plenty of rate revenue 
and therefore to provide good services. 
Applicahilitii of the model to Australia 
There are reasons for believing that the Tiehout effect is rather 
unlikely to operate under Australian conditions^ whatever its applic-
ability to the United States. 
a) The range of functions undertaken by the local authorities in the 
United States is much broader than that undertaken by their counter-
parts in Australia. Many services which we consider to be state 
functions are provided at least to some extent at the local level in 
the U.S.A. 
e.g. Education^ health and welfare services^ police services and 
housing. As Jay points out^ "In Australia^ the functions of local auth-
orities do not go much beyond the provision of local roads, the removal 
of garbage, the provision of parks, gardens and libraries, of some of 
the water supply and of a dwindling proportion of the electricity 
supply. 
R.Jay, Public Finance in the Expanding Community, A paper presented 
to the Institute of Municipal Administration at the National Symposium 
on the Expanding Community, May, 1970. 
When this limited range of services is oonsidered, it seems 
unlikely that preferences for services of this nature will overshadow 
in importance the effects of other factors influencing location in a 
particular community. If Tiebout's model is freed from the unrealistic 
assumption that equal employment opportunities are accessible from all 
areas3 then it loses much of its potency^ unless em^plom^t patterns 
tend to be highlvi correlated with the intensity of demand for local 
public goods. It has been suggested that disparities in employment 
opportunities which exist between Australian regions have led to a 
substantial out migration from rural areas. If this is soj then 
differences in employment opportunities would appear to be a far more 
important factor influencing location decisions than is the pattern of 
local piiblic services available. 
b) A second criticism of the model arises because of the distribution 
of income. In Australia^ local government services are financed 
primarily from property taxes. The amount of revenue which can be 
raised from these taxes depends upon the incomes of the residents of a 
community. Thus^ the variety and quality of local government services 
depend very much in some cases on the wealth of the local resident 
community. The distribution of persons among local government communities 
F.Doddridge and K. Holland^ Population Drift New South Wales 
1967/1969. (Sydney: Department of Decentralisation, 1970), pp. 1-12. 
also depends not cmly upon preferences hut also upon their wealth 
(ability to buy into a preferred locality). Therefore^ unless incomes 
and yreferences for local public goods org related^ then mobility does 
not adjust distribution of persons to match preferences among local 
government services^ but both distribution of population and variation 
in the pattern of local government services are determined by the same 
factors. 
It would therefore seem that people of moderate means who regard 
public services highly^ may be unable to satisfy their needs. Although 
they wish to allocate their incomes between private and public goods so 
that they can enjoy an extensive range of quality local government 
services^ their store of wealth may be insufficient to allow them to 
buy into a preferred locality. This is^ of course, true of all goods 
and services - the poor can buy less than they wish. What is different 
in this case is that more than the individual*s cost share for the good 
is involved. A prerequisite to enjoying the benefits of the services 
requires the ijidividual to outlay a considerable sum to purchase a 
property or to pay a high rent, reflecting perhaps, among other things, 
the capitalised value of the public services. Only after these pre-
requisites are met do the goods become available to him. This is not 
true of most goods and services. 
c) Several of the modeVs assumptions can be viewed with some scepticism. 
It has already been argued that the Tiebout effect will be less likely 
SD 
to o-perate when freed from its assumption that equal employment 
opportunities are accessible from all areas. The model also assumes 
that consumer voters have full knowledge of differences in revenue 
and expenditure patterns which are offered by various communities, 
and that they react to these differences. From discussion with 
interviewees the impression was gained that most people had little 
idea of the revenue expenditure pattern that was offered by adjoining 
communities^ and no knowledge of what was offered by others more 
distant. 
Although it has been argued that the Tiebout effect may not be 
as great under Australian conditions^ there are indications that it 
may operate to some extent. 
e.g. (a) Some people locate in "feeder" areas to certain preferred 
schools in the belief that these offer their children some educational 
advantages. Thus^ even though education is provided at the state levels 
it is nevertheless evidence of the Tiebout effect at work. 
(b) Studies by Doddridge and Rolland and by Valy^ indicate that 
dissatisfaction with the quality of certain council provided services 
^Ibid., p. 16. 
^M.T. Valyy Report to the Department of Decentralisation and 
Development on Some Sociological Aspects of Life in New South Wales 
Country Towns (Sydney: Macquarie Universityy 1965). 
eo 
(lihrary services^ sporting and recreational facilities) contributes 
to some people*s decisions to move to other communities. 
To sum up^ it has been argued that the Tiebout effect does not 
operate to the same extent in Australia as in America because of the 
limited range and basic nature of services supplied by councils in this 
country. However, although other considerations obviously overshadow 
it in importance as factors influencing location decisions, the fact 
that the Tiebout effect competes with these other factors means that 
it is still operative. The greater the extent to which it operates, 
the more homogeneous will be any community's demand for local public 
services, and the easier will be the task of supplying these services 
so that their provision reflects community needs. 
Ironically, the very set of circumstances which tends to diminish 
the impact of the Tiebout effect (the basic nature of the services 
provided by Australian councils) may give rise to a mechanism which 
provides a solution to the problem of supplying public services in 
the way described above. This kind of assumption will be the basis 
for one of the local government decision models outlined below. 
However, many authors point to the sensitivity of local government 
to community needs. Proceeding on the assumption of extreme sensitivity 
of local government decision makers to consumer voter preferences, the 
following model might he developed. 
2. A Local Government Expenditure Model Based on Sensitivity 
For simplicity^ the model does not take account of commercial 
or industrial ratepayers. All revenue is assumed to he raised from 
residential rates. 
The follou)ing assumptions are also made: 
(i) The provision of services by any community does not result in the 
spillover of benefits or costs to other communities. 
(ii) Aldermen are able to obtain detailed information about the costs 
of supplying services and the outputs which arise from this expend-
iture. 
The flow diagram in Figure 2-1 illustrates the relationships which 
exist in the model. 
A number of factors influence each consumer voter^s demand for 
local public services. 
(i) Socio-economic variables such as level of education attained^ 
occupation^ income levels country of origin etc. 
(ii) Environmental factors such as climate^ distance inland or from 
large cities. 
(Hi) The available stock of goods. 
e.g. If the community is well endowed with swimming poolsy then the 
demand for these cormodities will not be as great as it would he if 
the stock was meagre. 
(iv) The normal pattern and level of services which is supplied. It 
FIG S-l 
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is argued that the electorate becomes conditioned over time to what-
ever is supplied^ and accepts this supply as normal. The pre-existing 
pattern is seen as the major factor influencing preferences. 
Deviations arise from pressures of various sorts, 
e,g, A special interest group (a pool committee) or a group of elect-
ioneering aldermen may he able to create or change the demand for a 
particular service by a programme of persistent propaganda. Similarly y 
an interested group may be able to alter the aldermen^s views of 
community demand. The end result would be the same. 
The supply of services is determined by decision makers (profess-
ional officers and ultimately^ the aldermen) who take account of the 
needs of the community and the revenue available. Decisions made by 
the aldermen on the bases of each alderman^s perception of community 
demand for services becomes in turn supply of these same services to 
ratepayers. The more accurate is the alderman's assessment of comm-
unity demand^ the more closely his perceived demand of community needs 
rûill resemble true demand. 
In Figure 3-2^ DD represents an alderman's view of community 
demand; D*D' is actual demand. Since each alderman's assessment of 
where DD lies is in fact his demand curve for re-election^ then he 
will responsive to signals he receives through contact with the 
population. 
Alderman's Assessment of Community Demand 
FIG 3-2 
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Information system 
The model supposes that an information/propaganda/feedback system 
operates within the community. Through this system consumer voters 
are able to register approval or disapproval of expenditure decisions^ 
and the transmission of these feelings may lead to adjustments in 
expenditure being made. Although it is obvious that the system must 
operate imperfectly^ it is nevertheless likely to be a more sensitive 
system than those which operate at the state or national level. Lewis 
has summarised some of the main argiments which have been advanced why 
greater sensitivity to community needs could be e3::pected at the local 
1 7 
level. 
a) The government body is physically and psychologically closer to 
residents. 
b) It allows personal knowledge of decision makers by residents. 
Aldermen are generally in their constituency more often than are state 
or federal pax^liamentarians. In this sense they are more accessible^ 
even though most of them do not keep regular office hours. 
c) It is likely to be more flexible in adapting services to the needs 
of a particular area^ and to changes in those needs as the area 
develops. 
R. B. LewisJ Works or Welfare. A Paper presented to the Australian 
Local Government Women^s Association^ South Melbourne Town Eall^ May 
1972. 
He concludes that^ "In shorty it allows better communication 
between those who need services and those who provide them." 
There are varied means by which aldermen may obtain reactions to 
their decisions. These include: 
a) Interest groups which are formed for specific purposes and become 
pressure groups advocating certain policies, 
e.g. A number of pool committees have been formed in recent times in 
the City of \Jollongong to press for the construction of swimming pools 
in certain suburbs. 
b) Continuing bodies such as progress associations and political 
parties usually make their opinions known to aldermen. 
c) Many consumer voters have individual contact with aldermen. In 
some cases aldermen directly solicit their constituents* opinions on 
various matters, 
d) Aldermen are sometimes guest speakers on open line telephone pro-
grammes as featured on radio in recent times. Consumer voters often 
avail themselves of these opportunities to make known their opinions, 
e) Letters to the editor can also be a means by which aldermen obtain 
feedback, 
f) The ultimate guiding mechanism of course is the ballot box. Can-
didates make judgements about the popularity of their own and other 
candidates' polioses on the basis of the size of the vote obtained, 
Policies may be tempered accordingly. 
Adjustments in supvln 
The nature of the feedback which he receives through the infor-
mat%on system will determine whether the alderman needs to change his 
assessment of community demand. Various disapproving groups or 
individuals may bring pressure to hear on him to attempt to persuade 
him to modify his thinking. The alderman must then try to assess 
whether the individuals or groups concerned are representative of 
popular opinion. If he decides that this is so^ then some adjustments 
will be made. 
i.e. In terms of Figure 3-2 he will now feel that there is considerable 
disparity between DD and D'D'. DD must be accordingly adjusted. 
If the alderman decides that the pressure group represents an 
extremist minority, then no adjustments will be made. 
Creation or manipulation of demand 
The model also allows for decision makers and other interested 
groups to manipulate the community's demand for a public service. A 
determined group of ardent conservationists, for example, may be able 
to convince the electorate that parks bestow greater benefits on the 
community than had previously been realised. If this occurred, then DD 
(community's demand curve) would move outwards to the right, say to 
DfDf in Figure 3-3. If the model's relationships are correct, D'D', a 
typical alderman's view of community demand for parks, will also move 
outwards to D"D". 
- -
Manipulation of Demand 
FIG 3 - 3 
E X P E N D I T U R E ON PARKS DEMANDED. 
That DD and D'D' and also D^ and D"D" do not ooinoide simply 
reflects the rather realistic assianption that the information system 
is imperfect and that aldermen are fallible. 
The important relationships restated 
The important relationships of the model will now he restated. 
Consumer demand for local public services is influenced by a number 
of variables. But demand is primarily determined by the pre-existing 
patterns to which consumers have been conditioned. Deviations from 
the normal pattern may arise from pressures of various sorts which 
have been discussed above, \^ith a view to re-election^ each alderman 
must make his own assessment of community demand for each service. 
The model also allows for the possibility of individuals or groups 
influencing community demand for certain services, 
2, An Alternative Local Government Expenditure Model Based on Homogeneity 
of Demand, ̂ ^ 
As was hinted at above^ the basic nature of the services provided 
by Australian councils may give rise to a mechanism which simplifies 
local public goods supply. The services provided are so basic^ that 
it could reasonably be expected that demand for these services is far 
am indebted to Mr, E,G, Brennan of Australian ¡National University 
for his assistance in the development of this model. 
more homogeneous than would he the case at the national level where 
a more eo::tensive and diverse range of services is supplied. 
Diagrarmatically, individual demand curves for a particular service 
might appear as in Figure 3-4, 
The model also assumes (as did the previous model) that aldermen 
have access to detailed information about the cost of supplying services 
and the outputs resulting from such expenditures. It therefore follows 
that these decision makers could acquire the knowledjge necessary to 
determine their own demand curve for a particular service. This is not 
true of most other members of the community. 
A simple eosample at this point will illustrate haw the determination 
by an alderman of his own demand curve will be a useful exercise. I 
assume a local cormunity comprised of four individuals A^ By C and D. 
Cost shares for financing public services in the community are fixed 
and known. These shares are determined by the value of each person's 
propertyJ as shown in Table S-1 below. 
Homogeneous demand Curves 
FIG. 3 - 4 
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TABLE 3-2 
Individual Cost Shares of Public Goods Supply 
Person Value of Property Proportion of Cost of Ser-
vices for which each person 
is responsible 
A $10,000 1/2 
B $ 5,000 1/4 
C $ 2,500 1/8 
D $ 2,500 1/8 
It should be noted that it is not possible for aldermen to shift 
the burden of finanoing public goods from one group to another. Once 
the level of relative property values is established, cost shares are 
fixedJ 
The following assumptions are also made, 
a) Property values reflect income levels. 
h) Income levels and demand for local public goods are positively 
related. (This assumption is not completely necessary for the desired 
conclusions to be established). 
c) Demand for local public goods is relatively price inelastic. 
Bearing in mind that homogeneity of demand has already been assumed, 
the analysis proceeds as follows. Demand curves for the four individuals 
are shown in Figure 3-5. 
e.g. A's demand curve is represented by D^. 
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MC is the maTgvndt oost of proV'id'Lng the sewice vts 
supply pHoe). A's share of the cost will he equal to half of MC 
(hosed on property shares and established in Tahle 3-1). This is the 
supply price to A^ and is represented hy MC^. A will therefore demand 
^a ^^ ^^^ service - the amount represented hy the point where MC^ 
intersects D^. B's share of the cost will he equal to 1/4 of MC and 
is represented hy MC^. ^cd ^^^ supply price to hoth C 
and D (one-eighth of MC). The quantity of the service demanded hy each 
individual is indicated on the horizontal axis hy Q^^ Q^ and Q^ 
respectively. The result obtained from Figure 3-5 is largely consistent 
with the views of those who helieve that with regard to public goods^ 
the quantity demanded hy people varies inversely with their cost shares. 
It can he seen that under the assumptions of the model the 
quantities demanded hy various members of the community fall within a 
fairly narrow range. Any one of these individuals could use his own 
demand curve to make a decision ahout the quantity to he supplied^ and 
the result thus determined would he a satisfactory compromise. Since 
the alderman has access to sufficient information to he ahle to determine 
his demand curve^ the model states that he will come to an expenditure 
decision on the hasis of this curve. It should he noted that if the 
assumption of inelastic demand for local public goods is dropped^ a far 
less satisfactory result is obtained. 
Conclusions to he drawn from the models 
Two models have been developed, to explain how an individual 
alderman might arrive at eo:::penditure decisions about the services 
for which his government is responsible. If these explanations are 
plausible, then both would predict that council's production of each 
service it supplies will be closely related to consumer preferences. 
This assumes that the preferences of each alderman are representative 
of those of the people he represents. It must also be realised that 
individuals yrlll prefer different levels of output, yet only one 
level of output can be provided. Some output level which is a sat-
isfactory compromise reflecting community demand must be selected. 
For simplicity, it has been decided to use the mean of the 
desired level of public goods production specified by all citizens. 
The advantage of using this figure is that it represents the production 
12 level with a minimal allocative distortion. 
4. An Empirical Study 
A study was carried out in the City of Wollongong to test the 
ideas outlined above, and the following hypotheses were advanced. 
1. That with respect to the nine services listed below there is no 
significant difference between the proposed level of expenditure as 
19 
E.G. Brennan, Public Goods and Factor Pr%ces^ Paper delivered at 
Australian mtional University, Play 1973. 
determined by oouneil and the mean amount desired by the pojpulation 
of the City of Wollongong. 
Services 
a) Roadsj streets^ kerbing and guttering 
b) Senior Citizens' Centres 
c) Swimming Poo Is 
d) Town Planning 
e) Library Services 
f) Child Mnding Centres 
g) Parks and Gardens 
h) Street Lighting 
i) Baby Health Centres, 
2. That the revenue expenditure pattern of the City of Wollongong 
Council will be of little or no importance in the location decisions 
of residents of that community. 
Experimental design 
(i) The Sample 
To test these hypotheses^ a sample was taken from the population. 
The City of Wollongong had an estimated population of 161^143 as at 
12 
21st December^ 1970 and covers an area of 276 square miles. The 
7 
Source: 1971 Census of Population and Statistics - computer 
offprints. 
city is divided into five wards of approximately equal size with 
respect to population. Each ward is represented by three aldermen. 
Two hundred households were randomly selected from the elect-
oral rollsj with both owner ratepayers and non-ratepayers being 
included in the sample. This was done by selecting the top name from 
each seventh page of the electoral roll for each of the five wards. 
The sample thus obtained exceeded two hundred^ so that a reserve list 
of households was available. 
Two hundred households represent a saxnple size of about one half 
of one percent. The head of each selected household was contacted 
and asked to consent to an interview and to provide answers to a 
questionnaire sheet. A -wide level of acceptance was obtained after 
the initial contact had been made, 
(ii) Instruments used 
A four page interview schedule was usedj but only questions 8 and 
14 
12 are directly relevant to the findings of this chapter. Question 8 
purports to measure consumer/voter demand for the services listed above, 
These services were selected because expenditure upon them can be more 
easily varied than it can be on some other services. 
''see Appendix B. 
I would like to acknowledge the advice and assistance given to me 
by Mr. A. Kondos and Professor S. Encel of the University of New South 
Wales with respect to the sampling technique used and the questionnaire 
form referred to above. 
e. g. If the number of garbage aolleotions per household per week was 
to be altered from one to two aolleotions^ then a massive extra 
outlay would be required. Expenditure on the services under consid-
eration can be varied (within reason) by any amount and in response to 
consumer demand. 
The amounts in Column A represent counciVs proposed expenditure 
on these services for 1972, The decision to include these amounts was 
not taken lightly^ and was made only after long discussions with a 
number of economists. My own feeling s ̂ which were shared by some y 
were that most people are abysmally ignorant of the costs of providing 
services, or the outputs which arise from given expenditures. If this 
is true, then the responses obtained would not be very meaningful, since 
these responses were to be used as an indication of the level of out-
put of each service desired by the community. 
It was therefore decided to include these amounts as a guide or 
benchmark for consumers. It is stressed however, that every respondent 
was invited to vary expenditure on each item by any amount he wished. 
The extra cost or savings resulting from these variations were easily 
calculated for the average ratepayer. It is thus contended that each 
respondent was able to obtain a fairly accurate idea of his cost share 
of providing the level of services he required. 
The most acceptable alternative would appear to be to provide 
output figures which could be expected from a set of expenditures on 
each iterrij and again to indicate the cost to the average ratepayer 
for each level of expenditure. The amounts in Column A could then 
he omitted. It was felt that this could he a more difficult task for 
people to complete, and that the risk of rejection would he higher. 
It is intended, however, to use this method in a follow up study, and 
to compare the results with those tabled in this paper. 
The amounts in Column A were calculated in the following manner. 
Estimated total net ex;penditure on each service from General Fund 
and Loan Works Programme 1972-73 was calculated.^^ The figure for each 
service was expressed as a percentage of total net spending on these 
services. The resulting figure was expressed in money terms (an amount 
out of a total of $100) and rounded to the nearest SOfj^ for ease of 
understanding hy the respondents. 
These services represented 32% of council's proposed expenditure 
for the year. It was calculated, on the hasis of an average residential 
rate of $90, that each $1 hy which the respondent wishes to vary the 
total of $100 in Column A, would mean a change of 30<^ in the average 
ratepayer*s hill. 
In Column B, the consumer voter, hearing in mind the cost of this 
expenditure to the average ratepayer, was asked to express his desired 
^^Sources: Wollongong City Council, Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure - 1972. 
level of expenditure on each service. The total in Column B would 
thevefore reveal the consumer voter's desired level of expenditure on 
services (revenue)^ and the amount spent on individual items the 
expenditure pattern that was desired. 
Question 12 of the questionnaire was intended as a rough measure 
of the validity of the Tiehout model to Australian conditions. 
Specifically it was designed to test the importance of the revenue/ 
expenditure patterm offered by the City of Wollongong in the location 
duecisions of people who had settled in the municipality. 
(Hi) Test administration 
Question 8 was by far the most difficult question to answer on the 
schedule. It was often found necessary to leave the questionnaire 
overnight with the interviewee so that it could be perused more care-
fully. If the head of household was not present and the family was 
willing to co-operate, then question 8 was carefully ex^plained to 
another adult member of the household (usually the wife) and the schedule 
collected the following day. 
It was interesting to note that those who experienced most d i f f i c -
ulty in answering question 8 were those who were concerned for the 
welfare of other groups. 
e.g. A middle aged family which did not wish to pay more in rates spent 
considerable time adjusting expenditure so that a greater outlay was 
possible on child minding centres and senior citizens' centres. Those 
who answered in a more "selfish" or personal way had fax* less 
difficulty. It was felt that unlike some other people^ their welfare 
did not depend to any significant degree upon the welfare of other 
people, 
(iv) Statistical procedure 
With question desired expenditure on each of the services for 
all subjects was totalled. The mean^ standard deviation and variance 
for each service was then calculated. For each service a "z" test was 
used to determine if there was a significant difference between proposed 
council exp>enditure (Column A) and the mean amounts in Column B (desired 
level of expenditure). A product moment correlation between the two 
sets of figures (Column A and the mean amounts in Column B) was also 
calculated to measure how closely the overall pattern of supply was in 
accord with the preference pattern. These results are shown in Table 3-2, 
1^0 statistics were applied to the results of question 12. The 
results were simply tabled in Table 3-3. 
Results 
TABLE 3-2 
Proposed Expenditure and Desired Expenditure as 
Specified by Sample Group 
Ho: u -- X ^ 0 
u X SX 
Proposed Desired Standard 
Service Expenditure Expenditure ' Deviation 




































































r = .998 
p<. 0006 
TABLE 3-3 
Number of People Who Res-ponded to Each Category 
Category Number of People No Importance 118 
Little Importance 44 
Important 29 
Very Important 8 
Most Important Factor ^ 
Total 200 
Discussion 
The results obtained lend support to both hypotheses. Table 3-1 
can be interpreted in such a way that the null hypothesis may be 
accepted. I.e. that there is no significant difference between 
council's proposed expenditure and the mean amount desired by the 
sample group (and hence the total population). This would be true for 
each of the nine services under consideration. It also seems that the 
respondents did not wish to vary greatly the total amount spent on 
services. They merely wished to reallocate the total expenditure among 
the different services. 
It must be pointed out that another plausible explanation could be 
offered for the results above. 
The results may simply indicate that people are prepared to accept 
whatever is given to them or that they were too greatly influenced by 
Column A. There are reasons for believing that this is at least not 
entirely the correct escplanation. 
(i) The sizes of the standard deviations of scores for desired 
eo:penditure (SX) are quite large relative to the means (X) for each 
of the nine services, 
e.g. X and u correlated most closely for eoqpenditure on Roadsj Streets 
etc. Nevertheless^ a standard deviation of $10. 31 was obtained. The 
range of scores for this service extended from $40 to $130. 
(ii) A considerable variety of responses was obtained for each ser-
vice. This is implied by (i) above^ but a further measure can be used 
to illustrate this point. 
e.g. If a significant change from u was represented by a score of 10% 
above or below two significant changes by a variation of 20% above 
or below etc., then 81 significant changes were recorded for eo:::pend-
iture on Roads, Streets, Kerbing and Guttering out of a sample of 200 
people. 
The high correlation coefficient obtained between Column A and the 
means for Column B would indicate that the overall pattern of expend-
iture is in close accord with the pattern of preferences as expressed 
by the sample group. This correlation remains very high even when the 
range of services exclusive of roads, streets etc. (expenditure upon 
which is responsible for the largest amount) is considered. 
This kind of result is -predicted by the model and would he re-
inforced if aooompanied by the Tiebout effect. 
The results shown in Table 2-3 suggest that the Tiebout effect 
is not of any great importance. However, in marginal cases where an 
individual perceived the sum of all factors pertaining to a number of 
communities as being equal, the revenue/expenditure patterns offered 
by the communities may be the determining factor. 
6. Conclusion 
The results strongly suggest that a mechanism does exist whereby 
people are supplied with local public goods so that this supply 
reflects community preferences. The results do not however show 
clearly what the nature of the mechanism is. Both of the models out-
lined above would a:ppear to offer plausible explanations. In fact, 
both could be operative together, but in one sense they are alien to 
one another analytically. Their policy implications are quite different I 
Let us assume that the results can be generalised and that the 
supply of services offered by councils is in accord with community 
preferences. If this is so because of the sensitivity of decision 
makers to preferences, then it might follow that the range of functions 
entrusted to councils should be expanded and this in turn would lead to 
an overall improvement in the allocation of resources between private 
and public goods and between different kinds of public goods. 
-se-
lf^ on the other handj the result is due to the homogeneous nature 
of the demand for local -public goods arising from the basic nature of 
the goods then the range of functions should not be extended. The 
introduction of extra functions (e.g. responsibility for educational 
services) would lead to greater diversity of demand^ and the successful 
mechanism would be weakened. 
The results tabled in this chapter are encouraging and suggest 
that further study might he profitable. 
- -
CHAPTER IV 
PREFERENCES FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN WOLLONGONG AND 
SHELLHARBOUR - SOME COMPARISONS 
1. A Further Empirical Study 
In Chapter I I I , two local government models were developed. 
Each offered an explanation for the results obtained from a study 
carried out in the City of Wollongong. The study was designed to 
reveal consumer preferences for local government services, and to 
discover if these services were supplied in such a way that the 
supply was related to these preferences. A follow-up study under-
taken in the Municipality of Shellharbour, which adjoins Jfiollongong, 
will be described in the remainder of this chapter, which has been 
divided into the following two sections. 
In the first section, certain characteristics of the populations 
of Wollongong and Shellharbour will be compared. The likely effect any 
differences might have on preferences for local government services 
will be considered. The stock of local public goods available to the 
two populations will also be compared. These two factors (character-
istics of the population and the stock of goods available) could 
Teasonably be expected to be important determinants of overall 
demand for public goods. This is suggested by Figure 3-1 in 
Chapter I I I . 
In the second section^ a method similar to that used in the 
\^ollongong study will be used to determine the extent to which the 
supply of services by Shellharbour Council is related to consumer 
preferences. The preferences of the two populations for local public 
goods (as measured by the two empirical studies) will also be compared, 
2, Some Possible Determinants of Demand 
a) Characteristics of the populations 
The two populations were compared on a number of dimensions^ 
including total size^ density^ rate of growth^ age distribution^ 
educational attainments^ nationality and various indicators of 
economic well being, 
(i) Size^ density and rate of growth 
TABLE 4-1 ̂  
'Population Size, Density and Rate of Growth 
Wollongong and Shellhophoup 
Characteristic of Municipality Wollongong Shellharhour 
Area at 20th June, 1971 - sq. miles 434 59.54 
Population at 30th June, 1966 149,506 22,061 
Population at 30th June, 1971 161,143 31,154 
Increase in population - June 1966-71 11,637 8,993 
Percentage population increase - 1966-71 7.7 40.8 
Density at 30th June 1971 - Persons per 
sq. mile 584.4 522.9 
Table 4-1 shows that the ̂ population of Shellharhour, although less 
than one-fifth the size of that of Wollongong, is nevertheless growing 
at a much quicker rate. The table also suggests that Wollongong is 
more densely settled, hut it should he pointed out that the density of 
Shellharhour is understated in the sense that most of the population is 
clustered into a couple of centres, whereas ̂ ollongong^s population is 
dispersed more evenly. If Shellharhour's much quicker rate of growth 
continues, then its population density will soon surpass that of 
Wollongong. 
Any effect that differences in population density might have on 
preferences for local public goods is not clear, but it does seem that 
there could he special problems for an area such as Shellharhour which 
is experiencing such a rapid rate of growth. These may include the 
^Source: Computed from 1971 Census of Population and Statistics 
data - Computer Offprints. 
difficulty of supplying additional social overhead capital such as 
roods etc. quickly enough to keep pace with the gvouiing population. 
This may he illustrated using the eoxxmple of sewerage facilities^ 
although the supply of these services is not the responsibility of 
Shellharbour Council. But rapid population growth has resulted in 
demand for these services far outstripping their supply^ and most 
2 * • • residents rely upon primitive sanitary pans. The important point is 
that any chronic shortage of council supplied facilities is likely to 
be expressed in greater consumer demand for these services, 
(ii) Age distribution 
TABLE 4-2^ 




%Males % females 
Shellharbour 
% Males % Females 
0" 6 11.3 11.5 14.5 14.4 
6-15 19.9 19.9 27.0 26.4 
16-20 8.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 
21-24 7.0 6.6 4.9 5.8 
25-29 7.4 7.1 6.8 8.3 
30-34 6.9 6.8 8.0 8.3 
35-39 6.7 6.3 7.2 6.8 
40-44 7.1 6.7 6.5 5.8 
45-49 6.9 6.2 5.3 5.0 
50-54 5.1 5.1 3.8 3.3 
55-59 4.5 4.4 2.7 2.6 
60-64 3.2 3.3 1.9 2.2 
65-69 2.2 2. 5 1.3 1.3 
70 -f- 2. 5 4.1 1.4 2.2 
^See Table 4-7. 
^Computed from 1971 Census of PopHation and Statistics data -
Computer Offprints. 
Table 4-2 suggests that the population of Skellharbour is 
overall a younger population than that of \^ollongong. Almost fifty 
percent of both males and females are less than twenty-one years of 
age. The large percentage of the Shellharhour population in the 0-5 
and 6-15 years age group suggests that there would he a relatively 
greater demand in that municipality for child minding centres^ baby 
health centres and perhaps swimming pools. The demand may not be 
greater in dbsolute termSj since it is suspected that the pre-existing 
supply patterns are the most important determinant of demand, 
(Hi) Country of origin 
TABLE 4-3^ 
Country of Birth of Residents of \iollongong and Shellharbour 
Country of Birth Wollongong Shellharbour 
7Males JoEemales JMales JoFemales 
Australia 67.9 71. 5 67.3 68.9 
U.K. and Ireland 13.1 13.2 18.2 17.9 
Austria 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 
Germany 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 
Greece 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 
Hungary 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Italy 3. 7 3.1 0.8 0. 5 
Netherlands 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.5 
Yugoslavia 4.9 3.3 1.6 1.2 
All others 6.2 5.1 5.8 6.9 
^Ibid. 
Table 4-3 shows that the Australian oontent of each population 
is about the same. Despite this^ certain differences in the pattern 
of ethnic composition are noticeable. 
e. g. Shellharhour contains a considerably larger percentage of British 
and German migrants^ but a smaller proportion of Italians and 
Yugoslavs. It does not seem possible to predict the effect of these 
differences on demand for council services. 
(iv) Characteristics of the workforce 
A greater percentage of the Wollongong population participates in 
the workforce. This is true of both males (58.16% Wollongong to 52.01% 
Shellharbour) and females (21.1% to 16.6%). This may simply be a 
reflection of the fact that a much larger percentage of the Shellharbour 
population is too young to work. Ceteris paribus^ this would have the 
effect of making Wollongong a more prosperous community. There are 
other reasons for believing this to be so. Wollongong has 14.3% of its 
workforce engaged in the professions^ as against 8% in Shellharbour. 
Wollongong also has a much larger proportion of its workforce engaged 
in the services sector. This can be seen from Table 4-4 below. 
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TABLE 4-4^ 
Industry of Employed Persons as a Percentage of Workforce 
Industry Wollongong Shelllwcrhour 
%Males %Females males %Females 
Agriculture^ forestry^ 
fishing 0. 5 0.48 1.6 1.6 
Manufacturi ng 47.5 22.1 50.4 32.2 
Mining 8. 9 0.21 5.5 0.1 
Electricity J gas and 
water 2. 6 0. 52 2. 7 0.2 
Construction 9.4 1.2 12.1 1.3 
Wholesaling and 
retailing 10.2 25. 6 9.0 24.5 
Transport 5.7 1.6 7.4 1.8 
Cortirmni cations 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.5 
Finance Z. 1 9.3 2.5 7.3 
Public Administration 1. 8 2.5 1.4 2.5 
Community Services 4.1 20.8 2. 7 12.8 
Entertainment 2.0 11.3 1.3 10.8 
Other 2.8 3.1 2.0 3.0 
A considerable percentage of the male workforce of both cormunit" 
ies (about 55%) is engaged in manufacturing and mining^ while a large 
proportion of females in each comrrnmity is involved in wholesaling 
and retailing. These similarities are not surprisingj since many 
Shellharbour residents find work in the steel manufacturing complexes^ 
the mines and the retail outlets located in Wollongong. 
^iHd. 
(v) other indioators of eoonomio well being 
Apart from l^ollongong*s lax'ger participation rate and larger 
proportion of professional people^ there are other reasons which 
suggest that it may he a more prosperous corrmunity. 
a) A higher percentage of its population has obtained each level of 
work qualifications. (see Table 4-5) 
b) A higher percentage of both males and females have been educated 
to at least years V and VI at the high school level, (see Table 4-6) 
c) Flush toilets and sewerage facilities are far more common in 
Wollongong than Shellharbour. (see Table 4''7). These facilities 
provide benefits which are capitalized into property values. Ceteris 
paribus^ property values in Wollongong would he higher, making it more 
expensive to buy into the community. Thus it may he argued that the 
greater availability of these facilities in \iollongong is an indication 
of that community's greater wealth. 
^It could also be argued that a) and b) above can be explained 
by Shellharbour's younger age structure. 
TABLE 4-5' 
Level of Qualifications Obtained 




Trade 15.1 0.9 14. 5 0.8 
Technician 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.5 
Non Degree Tertiary 1. 5 1.7 0.7 1.0 
Bachelor Degree 1.2 0. 3 0.36 0.09 
Higher Degree 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.01 
TABLE 4-6 8 
Level of Schooling Completed 
Highest Level Attended Shellharhour 
%Males %Females JMales VoFemales 
9.5 9.8 11.9 11.8 
23. 1 22.5 30.1 29.3 
0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.16 
14.6 15. 39 9.5 10.1 
3. 7 3.8 3. 6 3.4 
8.8 9.6 10.4 11.3 
17.0 19.2 16.4 17.7 
7.8 7.8 8.0 7.6 
11.8 8.5 8.6 6.5 
2.8 2. 7 1.5 1. 7 
Not yet attending 
Student attending school 
Never attended school 
Attended to infants 
Attended to primary 
Attended high school -
Attended high school - Yr.2 
Attended high school - Yr, Z 
Attended high school - Ir. 4 
Attended high school - Yrs. 





Sewerage disposal Facilities 
Corrmun- Type of Bo. of Flush Other Sanitary Other d 
ity Dwelling Dwellings Toilet Flush Pan Coll- Non Statec 
to Sewer Toilets ection 
% % % % 
Wollong- Houses Z6809 61. 7 13.8 23.6 0.8 
ong Self Con-
tained 
Flats 7196 78. 7 12.5 7.8 1.3 
Shellhar- Houses 7290 0. 19 24. 7 74.3 1.3 
bour Self Con-
tained 
Flats 341 0. 06 75.36 20.5 2.6 
(vi) General 
Overall^ there are indications that compared with the population 
of Shellharbour, VJollongong residents are older, in some ways better 
educated and possibly more prosperous. The apparent advantage in 
economic well being would suggest that demand for local government 
services would be greater in Wollongong than in Shellharboury provided 
incomes and demand are positively related. This would mean that on 
average, Wollongong residents would be prepared to spend a greater total 
amount on public services. 
Ibid. 
The younger age struoticpe of the Shellharhour residents 
suggests that at least in relative termsy a greater demand for such 
services as child minding centres and baby health centres would eodst. 
One might therefore suspect that on average, Shellharhour residents 
would specify that a lax^ger percentage of the total amount spent on 
services be allocated to the provision of these facilities. Certainly 
the differences between the two communities ar*e great enough to 
suggest that differences in preference patterns would emerge. 
b) Stock of Goods Available 
Data relating to the stock of public goods available to each 
community were also gathered, and some comparisons made. But the 
nature of the goods being considered is such that valid comparisons are 
very difficult to make, and attention should be drawn to these diffic-
ulties. 
If the goods were purely public to each community, then the problem 
would be greatly simplified. The number of persons in each community 
could be ignored, and only the total stock of each type of good need be 
considered. Since the optimal sharing size of a purely public good is 
infinitely large,^^ then the community with the larger stock of a par-
ticular good could be said to be better endowed with that good. 
^^J.M. Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs" Economica XXXII 
(1965) 1-14. 
On the other hand, if the goods were purely -private^ the amount 
available to each person in the community would he the relevant figure. 
A simple example^ involving two oommunitiesj A and B^ and one good, X^, 
illustrates this point, 
TABLE 4-8 
Stock of X^ Available to Each Community 
Community Population Total No. of Units Total No. of Units of 
of X^ Available X^ ^ Population 
A 6 6 1 
B 2 2 1 
If X^ was a purely public local good, then community A would be 
better endowed with the good than community B. Six units of X^ are 
equally available to all six members of the community, while only two 
units are available to each member of community B. If X^ was a purely 
private good, then the communities are equally well endowed, since 
each member of both A and B can enjoy one unit of X^ provided equal 
sharing arrangements are assumed. 
But the goods under consideration fall somewhere along the continuum 
between the purely public and the private good. Put differently, a 
unit of a good of this type can be jointly supplied to a number of indiv-
iduals, but consumption by any person reduces the amount of the good 
available to all other persons. 
e, g. The services which arise from the provision of a public road can 
he jointly supplied to a number of individuals. But if one individual 
uses the road, then there is some reduction in the benefits aoailahle 
to all others. 
Obviously^ neither the total quantity nor the per capita quantity 
available is a suitable measure for comparison. However^ it seems 
reasonable to assume that with regard to the situation depicted in 
Table community A is better endowed with X^ than community B^ 
provided X^ is a good with some degree of publicness. The reasoning is 
as follows: 
Suppose each community decides that a per capita supply of one 
unit of X^ should be maintained. Assume also that initially each 
community comprises only one person and that a unit of X^ is represented 
by one mile of sealed road. If A's population now grows to two persons^ 
the jointness characteristic of the good would mean that for all prac-
tical purposes both individuals could enjoy almost fully the mile of 
sealed road. To maintain the desired ratio^ A would now supply a second 
unit of X^y so that two miles of sealed road are now enjoyed (again for 
all practical purposes) by each individual. Residents of A also haoe 
an advantage with regard to choices available to them. A's population 
grows relative to B'Sj this advantage yjill become more pronounced. 
The example used is a fairly extreme one^ because a road is a good 
with a considerable degree of "publicness". But the same reasoning could 
he applied to any good with some publicness. It is equally obvious 
that a Qommunity of six people which has six hooks available to it is 
better off than a smaller community of two people sharing two books. 
Provided differences in quality are disregarded, it might then 
be concluded that wherever Wollongong (with its larger population) 
matches or exceeds Shellharhour in its per capita supply of a local 
public goody then the residents of Wollongong are better off than 
their counterparts in Shellharhour. Unfortunately, this kind of con-
clusion would be difficult to justify, since the assumption of equal 
quality of goods is extremely dubious. 
TABLE 
Quantity of Fublic Goods Available to mnicipalities 
Public Good Unit of Wollongong Shellharhour 
Measure- Total Quantity Total Quantity 
ment Quantity per person Quantity per person 
chains 
if Public Roads Kerbed Roads 
Parks & Res-















50066 .25 11200 . 36 
47321 .25 9200 .29 
62060 .31 9210 .29 
164766 .83 7500 .24 







11 ̂Information supplied by Town Clerks of Wollongong and Shellharhour 
in correspondence July, 197Z. 
Table 4-9 shows the quantities of a number of public goods 
available to the residents of Shellharbour* and Wollongong. On the 
basis of this information it does not seem possible to oome to any 
conclusions about which community is better endowed with public goods. 
Despite thisy one might suspect from observations that Wollongong 
enjoys superior facilities^ but this position is difficult to maintain 
without objective evidence. 
3. Supply of and Demand for Services in Shellharbour 
In Chapter IV, an empirical study undertaken in Nollongong to 
measure the demand for council provided services was summarised, A 
similar study was carried out in Shellharbour so that some comparisons 
could be made. The instruments and statistics used were similar to 
12 
those used in the Wollongong study. The sample used was also selected 
in much the same way from electoral rolls, but there were some differ-
ences, 
(i) The four wards in Shellharbour are very different in population 
size, Proportional representation was taken from each ward. 
Hi) The sample size was restricted to one hundred households which 
represents a sample size of 1 to 1 1/2%, 
Hypotheses (i) That with regard to the nine services below, 
proposed expenditure on each service by Shellharbour Council (represented 
by the amounts in Column A) will not be significantly different from 
the mean expenditure on each service desired by the population of 
^^See Chapter III, 
Shellharbour (the mean of the amount specified in Column B), 
Sevvices Roads^ streets^ kerhing and guttering 




Child minding centres 
Forks and gardens 
Street lighting 
Baby health centres, 
(ii) That the Tiehout effect will he regaj*ded as being 
of little or no importance by the residents of Shellharbour. 
(Hi) That the eoqpenditure patterns desired by the two 
communities will be different. 
13 




A Comparison of Desired and Proposed Expenditure 
Ho: X -' u = 0 
Service Column A-u Column B-X Standard "z" Score Decision 
Proposed Desired Deviation 
Expenditure Expenditure 
Roads^ streets 
etc. $63. 50 $65. 60 9. 864 .212 Accept Ho 
Senior citizens^ r 
centres Nil 2. 20 7. 271 .440 Accept Ho 
Swirrming pools 7.00 7. 40 3. 261 .122 Accept Ho 
Town planning 6.00 5.80 1.819 -.109 Accept Ho 
Library services 1. 50 1. 80 .934 .309 Accept Ho 
Child minding Nil 2. 80 3.513 .284 Accept Ho 
Parks and gar-
dens 9.00 9.50 3. 789 . 131 Accept Ho 
Street lighting 11. 50 11. 70 2.335 .085 Accept Ho 
Baby health 
centres 1.50 2.00 1.385 .361 Accept Ho 
Total $100. 00 $109. 80 
^^Source: Figures for proposed expenditure calculated from 
Municipality of ShellharhouTy Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure^ 
1972. 
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TABLE 4-11 
Mean Desired Expenditure on Services Specified 
by Households Sampled 
Service Wollongong 
Total Per Capita 
Expenditure Expenditure 
Shellharhour 
Total Per Capita 
Expenditure Expenditure 
RoadsJ streets 
etc. 161y 328 $10.87 $204, 050 $6. 55 
Senior citizens' 
centres 33^440 0.17 9, 635 0.31 
Swimming pools 222y 432 1.20 22, 303 0. 72 
Town planning 56y 989 0.28 17, 960 0. 58 
Library services 238y 040 1.20 5,845 0.19 
Child minding 
centres 22, 950 0.12 9,092 0. 29 
Parks and gardens 284,460 1.43 28, 500 0. 92 
Street lighting 308, 031 1.55 35, 694 1.15 
Baby health centres 30,576 0.15 6,866 0.22 
TABLE 4-12 
Cost to Average Ratepayer of Financing Desired 
Expenditure on Services 
Service Wollongong Shellharhour 
RoadSy streets etc. 




Childing minding centres 
Parks and gardens 
Street lighting 
Baby health centres 
$29.59 $14.35 
0. 46 0.66 
3. 29 1.57 








Percentage of Total Desired Expenditure Allocated 
by Consumers to Each Service 
Service % % 
Wollongong Shellharbour 
Roads^ streets etc. 64.1 60.1 
Senior citizens* centres 1.0 2.8 
Swimming pools 7.1 6.6 
Town planning 1.6 5.2 
Library services 7.1 1. 7 
Child minding centres 0. 7 2.7 
Parks and gardens 8.4 8.4 
Street lighting 9.1 10.5 
Baby health centres 0.8 2.0 
TABLE 4-14 
Importance of Tiehout Effect as Rated by Shellharbour 
Sample 
Response Category No. of Persons 
No importance 62 
Little importance 17 
Important 14 
Very important 4 
Most important factor S 
Total ^ 100 
Explanation of tables 
In Table 4-^10, Colwm 2 refers to the amounts in Column Ay 
Column S contains the mean of the amounts specified by respondents 
in Column B, Column 4 lists the standard deviations of the responses 
in Column B^ and Column 5 lists the "z" scores which indicate the sig~ 
nificance of the difference between the amounts in Columns 2 and 
In Table 4^11, the amounts shown in Column Z of Table 4''10 
(desired expenditure) have been converted to total and per capita 
expenditure desired on each service. The following method was used. 
In drawing up Column A^ it was calculated that a total expenditure 
of $197^518 by Shellharbour Council on roads, streets, etc. would be 
shown as $62^50. The households sam^pled indicated that on average 
they desired an amount of $65.60 to be spent on these services. This 
was converted to a total amount of $204,050 using the formula 
1 J • J $ 197518 X $ 65.60 Total expendvture desvred on roads etc. = 63"50 
Desired per capita expenditure was calculated by dividing total 
amounts by the population size. Corresponding figures were calculated 
for Wollongong. 
Another useful set of figures was determined by calculating the 
cost to the average ratepayer of providing the desired output of each 
service. These figures are shown in Table 4-12. The amounts were 
^^^Columns A and B refer to Appendix C. 
calculated as follows. ̂ ^ 
For Shellharbour^ a per capita expenditure of 55 on roads^ 
streets etc, was desired^ while a total expenditure on services of 
$10, 93 was specified. Roads^ streets etc. therefore account for 
S 55 
2Q g^ or 60.1% of expenditure on all nine services. The results of 
the survey indicate that the households sampled would he prepared to 
pay an average rate of $72,15^ of which $23,85 would he used to 
provide the services under consideration. The cost to the average 
ratepayer of providing the desired level of eo^^penditure on roads etc. 
would therefore he $60,1% of $23,85, Similar calculations were made 
for all nine services in Wollongong and ^ellharhour. 
Discussion 
The results lend support to all three hypotheses. Each hypothesis 
will he discussed individually, 
(i) The results shown in Table 4-10 support the first hypothesis. For 
each service, there is no significant difference between the mean amount 
desired hy the sample group and council^s proposed expenditure. When 
^^The validity of these figures rests on the assumption that Council 
income other than rate revenue remains unchanged. In compiling the 
questionnaire sheets for the two empirical studies it was assumed that 
the proportion of revenue for which rates are responsible is constant. 
Some discrepancy may therefore he observed. 
considered along with the corresponding Wollongong result^ it pro-
vides strong evidence for the belief that council*s output of 
services is closely related to consumer preferences. 
(ii) Table 4-14 suggests that the Tiebout effect may not enter to 
any great extent in residents ' location decisions. 
(iii) Table 4-11 suggests that the preferences of the two communities 
for the nine council supplied services are different. These differ-
ences are revealed more clearly by Table 4-12. It is significant 
that the seemingly more prosperous Wollongong population is prepared 
to spend twice the amount on the nine services as are Shellharbour 
residents. This suggests that demand for these services is positively 
related to incomes. 
But it seems unlikely that the differences in economic well being 
between the two communities would be so great as to produce such 
disparate sets of expenditure desired on local public goods. To pro-
duce such a result^ a significant positive coefficient of income 
elasticity would also be required. A more plausible explanation would 
seem to be that this kind of result is evidence for the belief that 
preferences are primarily determined by pre-existing patterns of supply. 
It is also interesting to note that Table 4-13 suggests that com-
pared with the Wollongong population Shellharbour residents wish to 
allocate a larger proportion of rate revenue for provision of child 
minding centres and baby health centres. It was suggested above that 
this might he sOy in view of the youngev age structure of Shellhar-
hour. 
Summary 
In this chapter it has heen argued that the preference pattern 
of Wollongong residents is different to that of the Shellharhour 
population. Some emipirical evidence was produced to support this 
assertion. The local government authority in each case appeared to 
provide services so that the supply was closely related to consumer 
preferences. In both municipalities^ the Tiebout effect seemed to he 
of little or no importance. 
CHAPTER V 
SOME DETEmiMî^TS OF DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 
1. Regression Analysis With Dvomij Variables 
In preceding chapters^ the discussion has been concerned mainly 
with a consideration of the extent to which a local council*s supply 
of services reflects the desires of the citizens. In this chapter^ 
some possible determinants of demand for local public goods will be 
examined. The technique which was adopted to do this involved 
regression analysis using dwmy variables. ^ 
Dummy vajridbles can be used to represent qualitative vax*idbles 
such as occupational status and nationality^ or to represent quantit-
ative variables such as age where it is thought that only broad age 
groupings ore relevant. If a conventional computing programme is to be 
used as it was in this study^ then one of the dummy variables must be 
dropped from each broad category. 
e.g. Suppose nationality was to be divided into three groupings -
Australian^ British and other nationalities. Then a dummy variable X 
^A description of the technique used can be found in J. Johnstone 
Econometric Methods 1st ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 221-228. 
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would he used for Australians^ X^ for British and no dumy variable 
would he used for other nationalities^ If Y represents the variable 
which depends upon nationality, then the relationship would take the 
form 
y = a ̂  i ' / i ^ Vs • 
The value for the other nationalities would he picked up in the 
constant term a. 
For simplicity, the problem of dropping a durrmy variable will he 
disregarded for the moment. 
Suppose for example, that a dependent variable, Y, the expenditure 
on roads by council desired hy consumers is regarded as depending on 
two qualitative variables, namely nationality and occupational status. 
¡Nationality is represented hy a dummy variable with two levels (British 
and Australian), and three levels of occupational status are postulated 
- professional, skilled and unskilled workers. There are then six 
possible combinations of dummy variables and the postulated relation-
ship is 
y = B/i + B/2 ^ Vff ^ " 
TABLE 5-1 
Occupational 
Status ¡Nationality X^ 
h h h h h 
I I 1 0 0 0 0 0 
I II 1 0 0 1 0 0 
II I 1 1 0 0 0 0 
II II 1 1 0 1 1 0 
III I 1 0 1 0 0 0 
III II 1 0 1 1 0 1 
If the symbol 0(Y/IIy I) is used to indicate the expeeted value 
of Yj given occupational status level II and nationality I, it can he 
seen from Table 5-1 and relationship I that 
0(Y/Is I) = B.^ 
-h B 0(Y/I, II) = B 
Oil/II, I) = B 
0(1/II, II) = B 
0(1/III» I) B 
0(Y/IIIy II) = B 
+ B^ -h B^ + B^ 
2 4 5 
+ B^ 
This scheme allows for interaction effects. Thus the difference 
between the nationalities for occupational status I is B^; for people 
of occupational status II it is B^ -h B^; and for people at level III 
it is B^ + B^. 
2. Procedure Used 
The programie used was able to take only ninety observations at 
a time. It was therefore necessary to split the Wollongong sample 
into two groupsy hereafter called Jrlollongong I and \Jollongong II. 
This made the interpretation of results more difficulty since it was 
necessary to check one sample against the other to ensure that the 
results being discussed were consistent across both samples. 
The classifications which were represented by dummy variables 
were as follows: 
a) Age 
Five groups classified according to age were used. These groups 





b) Occupational status 
Two categories of occupational status were compared. 
i.e. Skilled workers and professionals. The question was askedy "Is 
there any real difference between the two groups with regard to desired 
expenditure on the services under consideration?" 
I would like to acknowledge the assistance given by Dr. R.G. Gregory 
of Aust. Nat. Uni. who computed the regressions and helped with the 
interpretation of the results. 
c) MtionaViti4 
Two national groups^ British and Australian^ were compared. 
The aitn was to discover whether one Yiationality wished to spend more 
on particular services than did the other. 
By carrying out the regressions it was attempted to do three 
things, 
(i) To find out if expenditure on the vaj*ious services is 
related to age or nationality or occupational status. 
Hi) To attempt to discover the expenditicre coefficients of the 
various categories. 
(Hi) To investigate the expenditure elasticities for the various 
services. 
The first set of regressions involved the regression of expend-
iture on the various services against the age categories, to see if 
these expenditures were related to people's ages. The resulting 
equation would take the form of the relationship below: 
Y = + B/2 + + V« ^ « • 
For exampley when esupenditure on roads was regressed against 
people's ages, the resulting equation for the Wollongong II sample was: 
^ -h 2.60X(31-40) - .50X(41''50) 
Roads t^.Z9 t='.07 
+ 1.19X(51-60) -h 6.Z2X(6U) 
t=^1.19 t=6.32 
which means that there is a constant term of $64. 77 and that on 
average people in the 21-30 age group spend $1.55 lessj people in the 
31-40 age group spend $2. 60 more, and so on. 
It should he noted that there is a constant term plus a variable 
term for each age group. By combining the constant term with the 
relevant vaj^iahle term the mean expenditure of each age group can he 
obtained. A "t" score was determined for each coefficient of the 
vapc*iahle term. The coefficient was judged to he significant when the 
"t" score was greater than 2. This would mean that this variable 
(belonging to a particular age group) exerts a significant influence 
on a person's demand for expenditure on a certain service. 
Expenditure on each service was then regressed against occupational 
status and nationality. Finally, expenditure on each service was 
regressed against each of the above variables plus total expenditure on 
all services. The question being asked here was, "Is expenditure on 
each service related to a particular variable (e.g. age) or is it just 
that people xmnt to spend a lot on all services?" Put differently, the 
various cormodities were being divided into those with high expenditure 
elasticities and low expenditure elasticities. 
3. Results 
An enormous nurnber of regression results were obtainedj ocnd it 
is not intended to list these in detaily hut simply to discuss the 
qualitative conclusions. In general^ the number of significant 
results was quite smally and when a significant result was obtained 
in one half of the sample it was not always significant in the other. 
This was perhaps to be expected^ since earlier it was argued that a 
homogeneous pattern of demand for these services would exist. The 
masses of the people's scores clustered close to what the council 
provides, but in each sample there were some outlying observations. 
The outlying observations seemed to influence the regression lines 
considerably. These atypical scores would explain in part why 
different results were sometimes obtained in Wollongong I and 
Wollongong II. 
Roads 
The aoerage desired expenditure on roads ($65.56) was slightly 
more than what council planned to spend ($65.50) but the difference 
was not significant. Desired expenditure seemed to be unrelated to 
age but British people consistently wanted to spend more than Australians 
and skilled workers more than professionals. It would seem that expend-
iture on roads has a high expenditure elasticity since a significant 
result was obtained in both samples. 
i.e. Wollongong I "t" = 21.86, Wollongong II "t" = 11.24. 
Senior citizens 
Desired expenditure on Senior Citizens' Centres seemed to he 
unrelated to age. It should however he pointed out that the newly 
elected council won office on a xoidely publicised platform which 
stressed the need for these facilities in particular. It may he that 
this campai.gn caused all age groups in the community to he favourably 
disposed towards spending money to provide these goods. This argument 
is strengthened hy the fact that the average desired eocpenditure 
($1.52) was ccnsiderahly higher than what had heen planned ($0.50). 
Professionals consistently desired a higher level of expenditure than 
did skilled workers, while British people again wanted to spend more 
than Australians. It seems that Senior Citizens' Centres have low 
expenditure elasticity. 
Swimming pools 
People in the 30-40 age group consistently wanted to spend more 
than other age groups on swimming pools. A significant "t" score of 
2.64 was obtained from the Ifiollongong I sample^ hut a "t" score of 
only 1. 65 was recorded for Wollongong II. The equation derived from 
regressing expenditure on pools against age was as follows: 
E . = 5.09 + .73X(21''30) + 2.71X(31'40) 
pools ^^Qg ^^^yQ t=2.64 
+ .48X (41-50) + 1. 71(51-60) + 2.13(61+) 
t=.49 t=1.63 t^l.79 
This would meam that people in the 21-40 age group on average 
wish to spend $5.09 + $2.71 = $7.80. 
The average for all people was $6. 62. 
It seems quite logical that people in this age group would have 
a greater demand for pools since they could he expected to have 
children old enough to he regularly using these facilities. 
Skilled workers consistently wanted to spend more than profess--
ionals and Australians wanted to spend more than Britons. Swimming 
pools appear to have a high eoapenditure elasticity^ for in Wollongong I 
a "t" score of 4.00 was obtained, and in \iollongong II "t" = 2.37. 
Town planning 
Expenditure on town planning appears to he unrelated to age hut 
professionals wanted to spend more than skilled workers and Britons 
more than Australians. 
Libraries 
Expenditure on libraries appears to he unrelated to age although 
a significant result was obtained in Wollongong I where a "t" score 
of 4. 30 was obtained for people aged 31-40. A completely different 
pattern emerged in Mollongong II, so that a consistent story could 
not he obtained. Professionals consistently wanted to spend more than 
skilled workers and Australians more than Britons. 
Child Mindim centres 
Expenditure on these facilities was related to age in a way 
which was to he expected. People in the 20-30 age group consistently 
mnted to spend more^ and older groups wished to spend progressively 
less. The relationships are expressed in the equation helow. 
^Child Minding = ^^ ^ .82X(21^30) ^ .56X(3U40) 
•f .28X(41-50) + .11X(51-60) - .67XieO-i-) 
t^.24 t=.10 t=.60 . 
This means that people in the 21-30 age group on average wanted 
to spend $1.14 + $0. 82 = $1. 96. People over 60 on average wanted 
to spend $1.14 - $0. 67 = $0. 47. 
The average for all people was $1.35, while council planned to 
spend $0.50. 
British people consistently wanted to spend more than Australians 
and professionals more than skilled workers. This service has a low 
expenditure elasticity. 
Parks 
It would appear that people want to spend more on parks as they 
get older. This was a consistent hut not significant result. It is 
well illustrated hy the equation from Wollongong II. 
E . ^ 9.73 - 2.64X(21''30) - 1. 81X(31''40) - 1.42X(41-50) 
parKs ^^¿^gg t=-1.55 t^l.06 t=-.82 
- .38X(51-60) - .62X(60+) 
21 t=-. 36 
This means that people aged 21-30 on average msh to spend 
$9^73 - $2.64 « $7.09 whereas people aged 51-60 wish to spend 
$9. 73 - $0. 38 « $9.35 on average. 
Australians consistently wanted to spend more than Britons hut 
expenditure on parks appeared to be unrelated to occupational status. 
Street lightina 
Expenditure on street lighting seems unrelated to age but British 
people consistently xoanted to spend more than Australians and this 
difference was significant in Wollongong II "t" = 3.53. The releoant 
equation was: 
U'^h-f-.^^^ $6 -h 1.16(Aust.) + $2. 73 (British) Street l^ghtvng^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ 
This means that on average Australians wish to spend $7.16 and 
Britons $8. 73. 
This service has a high expenditure elasticity. 
Baby health centres 
Old people would not be expected to be interested in spending 
much money on this service^ and this ex:pectation was borne out by the 
results. 
People in the 20-30 and 31-40 age groups wanted to spend most, 
although the differences were not significant. Britons consistently 
wanted to spend more than Australians, and a significant "t" score 
of 2.83 was obtained from ]f/ollongong I. The "t" score of 1.36 from 
Wollongong II was not significant. This service has a low expenditure 
elasticity. 
4. General Conclusions 
The results suggest that British people on average wish to spend 
more on welfare type services such as senior citizens' centres^ child 
minding centres and baby health centres. This may be because they are 
accustomed to the wide range of services provided by councils in 
Britain. Australians on average wanted to spend more on parksj swimming 
pools and libraries. These differences were consistently recorded but 
were not often significant. Professionals wanted a greater level of 
eospenditure than skilled workers on senior citizens' centres^ town 
planning^ libraries and child minding centres. Age seemed to be a 
determinant of demand for baby health centres^ child minding centres 
and parksy but surprisingly^ not senior citizens' centres. Commodities 
with high expenditure elasticities were roads^ streets, footpaths etc., 
swimming pools and street lighting. None of the welfare type services 
such as senior citizens' centres, baby health centres etc. had a 
significant expenditure elasticity. 
In general the number of significant results was quite small, and 
when such a result was obtained in one half of the sample it was quite 
often not significant in the other. This was because most observations 
lay close together and the few extreme observations that were 
recorded had a big impact on the regressions. The kind of result 
obtained is consistent njith two explanations. 
a) That people don't know what they want and are prepared to accept 
whatever is given to them. 
OR 
b) People know exactly what levels of expenditure they want, and are 
supplied with these levels. 
Ideally, there would be some way of discriminating between the 
eooplanationsy hut the results do not allow one to do this. The results 
do however tend to strengthen the assumptions of the second model 
developed in Chapter IV. This model depended on the existence of a 
homogeneous pattern of demand for local government services existing 
within a community. If this is so, then certain policy implications 
follow. These have been foreshadowed in Chapter IV, and will be 
elaborated in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
i. Origin of the Adjustment Mechanism 
The final chapter of this work has been divided into two sections. 
In the first section, an attempt will be made to explain the origin 
of a mechanism which may enable local government authorities to provide 
services so that this supply is closely related to consumer preferences. 
In the second section, the mechanism referred to above is considered 
in a more realistic institutional framework. 
The evidence presented in Chapters I I I , IV and V suggests the 
following with respect to the two local government areas considered 
(Wollongong and ShelVruxrbour). 
(i) That a considerable degree of homogeneity of preferences for 
local public goods exists within each municipality. 
Hi) That the preferences of the residents of the two areas are 
different. 
(Hi) That in each municipality the supply of services provided by 
council closely reflects the preferences of the residents. 
It has already been argued that the homogeneity of preferences 
could be due either to the basic nature of services provided by councils 
or to the pre-existing pattern of supply to which the area is 
conditioned. ^ Even if it is conceded that these are the likely 
causes of the homogeneity of demand^ several questions still remain 
to he answered. 
a) If the services provided by councils are so basic that a homog-
eneous pattern of preferences results in a particular area, why 
aren^t preference patterns homogeneous between ajpeas. 
e.g. Why is the Wollongong preference pattern apparently different to 
that which exists in Shellharbour? 
b) If preferences depend an the pre-existing pattern of supply^ how 
did this pattern emerge? 
A single explanation provides a plausible answer to both questions. 
The solution depends on the operation of a Tiebout-type effectj 
although the likelihood of the Tiebout effect per se operating under 
Australian conditions was rejected in Chapter III. 
It has also been suggested that both factors could operate 
together. These two possibilities have been considered as if they 
are mutually exclusive because of their very different policy 
implications. 
2 
This possibility has been suggested by R.C. Gates. "Local 
Government in a Dyncmic Economy, " The Dynamics of Change. Papers 
presented at a conference on local government economics. University 
of Sydney, May, 1969. 
Tiehout claimed that under certain conditions people would tend 
to congregate in that area whose local government best satisfies 
their preferences for public goods, A homogeneous pattern of 
preferences will therefore tend to be established within each local 
government area, and the problem of public goods supply will be 
simplified* But the results shown in Tables 3-2 and 4-14 do not 
support this argument. 
What seems more likely is that people of similar occupations, 
similar income levels, similar nationality and people with other common 
interests tend to congregate viithin a particular area, largely because 
of these similarities. There is some empirical evidence to support 
this point of view, 
e. g. 
(i) Manning, following Stretton, has calculated that in 1966, 
Ku Ring Gai residents occupied $6,076 worth of real estate a head, 
J 
while Fairfield's citizens occupied $2, ZOO per head. This can be 
interpreted as evidence of stratification according to income or wealth 
^I. Manning. Local Government and the Redistribution of Income in 
Sydney. Paper delivered at the Urban Research Unit, Australian ¡National 
University, April, 1972, p. 9. 
di) In Chapter IV^ census data was tabled which suggests that 
stratification has occurred in Wollongong and Shellharbour according 
4 
to nationality, educational attainments and occupation. 
It is therefore argued that people stratify because of certain 
common interests rather than according to preferences for local public 
goods. Because each group shares so many common characteristics it 
would not be unreasonable to expect their preferences for local 
government services to be similar. This would give rise to the same 
end result as the Tiebout effect in that homogeneity of preferences 
would emerge in each municipality^ although a different pattern may 
develop in each community. 
2. A More Realistic Local Government Expenditure Model 
The analysis of Chapter III was concerned only with the way in 
which individual aldermen might arrive at expenditure decisions, and 
it was implicitly assumed that all aldermen of the party in power 
would arrive at similar decisions. ^ But it is rather unrealistic to 
maintain the assumption of homogeneity of preferences throughout an 
entire local government area. It seems more likely that stratification 
^See Tables 4-4, 4-6, 4-6. 
^"Independent" aldermen often behave as a party. At least this 
is the case in \iollongong and Shellharbour, where these aldermen 
campaign, caucus and vote together. 
within municipalities and nyithin mrds will ooaur. 
If this is so J then a number of different sets of preferences 
may exist within a municipality or ward. Since local facilities are 
financed from general rate revenue^ there will lusually he a certain 
amoimt of competition between groups. Aldermen realise that votes 
are won by satisfying preferences. The existence of different sets 
of preferences^ particularly within a wordy mcikes this objective more 
difficult to achieve. 
The result of differing preferences of different socio-economic 
groups might be a bargaining process or it might be simple dominance 
of one set of preferences over another. Which it will be depends 
largely upon the way ward boundaries are drawn and, if they are multi-
member wards, upon the electoral system. 
Bargaining would be most likely to occur if wards are heterogeneous 
and the electoral system is one of proportional representation. Under 
this system, a candidate can campaign successfully by appealing to a 
minority group. Aldermen are more likely to be tolerant of the views 
of all groups. 
Imposition would be the likely result if wards were very homogen-
eous and had a single member system, for each successful alderman 
could afford to take an intransigent view of minority preferences. The 
present electoral system in local government elections is a "winner 
take all" system where the biggest class takes all the positions within 
the particular ward. Even with heterogeneous wards this system is 
likely to lead to the dominance of one set of preferences over 
others. For as long as a team of aldermen campaigning in a ward 
are able to capture at least fifty-one percent of the vote, all will 
he elected^ so that they need only appeal to the majority. This last 
case seems to most accurately describe the situation which exists in 
l^ollongong, with each ward containing a variety of socio-economic 
gi»oups. Shellharhour appears to be more homogeneous. 
What now needs to be explained is how the total available funds 
are divided between the wards. It goes without saying that a ward's 
representatives are blamed if its interests are not looked after. 
As Fainter puts it, "bringing home the bacon" is politically important 
to each ward. ̂  Bargaining between the wards can therefore be expected, 
even if one party completely dominates the council. 
Since many facilities are of a localised nature, each alderman 
will probably feel that his ward should have what the others have. 
In the long run, this will probably result in each ward receiving a 
more or less equal share of the available revenue, and each will enjoy 
^M. Fainter, Local Government Budaetam Decision-Making. Faper 
delivered at Urban Research Unit, Australian national University. 
May, 1972, p. 22. 
• • 7 a similar set of facilities. But in any given period^ it would he 
unlikely that the priorities of all wards were the same. 
Bargaining for local facilities might then take the form of 
log-rolling. Aldermen may trade their votes on particular issues 
affecting other wards to ensure majority support on issues involving 
expenditure which would he viewed favotdrdbly hy their own constituents. 
There is some evidence that this type of bargaining between wards does 
occur^ the result being that the different preferences of differing 
groups tend to be satisfied. 
In Wollongongy Corrimal in Mard 2 is a quickly growing area with 
a substantial Housing Commission sectory and consequently a large 
number of young people. Windang^ in \iard is situated on the shores 
of Lake Illawarray and contains many elderly and retired people. The 
major item of expenditure planned for Corrimal in the life of the 
present council is a swimming pool. In Mndang^ the major expenditure 
item is a senior citizens' centre. This is consistent with what has been 
argued above. 
^This need not be the case, especially where sections of a ward 
contain a large number of people who are ineligible to vote, 
e g. Ward 4 in Wollongong has a number of suburbs with a very large 
migrant content, (e.g. Cringila). It is probably accurate to^ say that 
this part of the ward has missed out on its share of facilities. 
^J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 1960. 
3. Summarii 
The problem with which this thesis has been concerned arises 
because of the nature of public goods. The market works quite well 
in supplying most goods^ but certain characteristics of public goods 
(jointness of supply and difficulty of exclusion) would cause market 
failure in the supply of these corrmodities. They must therefore be 
provided through the public budget. But the government faces the 
problem of being ignorant of consumer preferences for public goods, 
and reasons have been given why consumers will disguise these. 
Certain a-priori reasons were outlined for believing that the 
supply of goods by local government authorities would be closely 
related to consumer preferences. Empirical studies designed to reveal 
consumer preferences were described, and the results suggested that 
public goods supply does reflect these preferences. It was argued 
that this was due to the homogeneity of demand for public goods which 
exists within commmities, and that this homogeneity develops because 
people sharing certain common characteristics (income, occupations, 
nationality etc.) tend to congregate in the same area. If this reas-
oning is accurate, then it could be claimed that local government is 
one level of government where political failure in the provision of 
public goods is less likely to occur. 
If this is so then it raises the interesting and important question, 
"What functions should be allocated to local government authorities?" 
This would seem to be an area worthy of future research. 
AFFEmiX A 
LOCALISED PUBLIC GOODS 
1. Impure Public Goods 
In Chapter II, the dieau^sion centred around the polar case of 
a public good, the purely public good. It was shown that a compet-
itive market must fail to meet the conditions necessary for a Pareto 
optimum. In fact, the market would produce little or nothing of 
such a good. The nearest approach to a purely public good and th^ 
example most frequently given is national defence. But as many 
writers have argued (Samuelson included) very few examples of a purely 
public good can be found, ^ 
i,e. Few goods eskibit the special forms of joint supply or external 
economies (the extreme case of which is impossibility of exclusion) to 
the degree described in Chapter II. But as Head points out, the 
presence of elements of either characteristic is all that is required 
to support Samuelson*s general conclusions. Goods which satisfy these 
^J. Margolis, "A Corrment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, " 
Review of Economics and Statistics XXXVII (1954), 347-49. 
^J, G, Head, "The Welfare Foundations of Public Finance Theory" 
op. cit. , p. 26, 
less demanding requirements include education^ roads, bridges, 
hospitals and many others. Even though these "impure" public goods 
contain strong private elements, it can be illustrated in a number 
of ways that they a:re very different from private goods. Figure 6A-1 
is an adaptation of Figure 2-5, and clearly shews some of these 
differences. 
Fire protection would be an example of an "impure" public good. 
Although it provides for joint consumption, it also has the character-
istic that once oictput is fixed, an increase in one man*s consumption 
implies a reduction in some other individual's consumption. Given a 
particular quantity of fire fighting resources, an increase in fire 
protection afforded individual A must be at the expense of fire 
protection provided to individual B. But since fire protection for 
A's home may indirectly protect B's home and vice versa, the trade 
o f f between their consumption of fire protection need not be unity as 
it must be with private goods. Thus, even though no resources what-
ever were allocated to protect B's home, he would still enjoy some fire 
protection indirectly from the provision for A. 
In Figure 6A-1, the utility possibility frontier for a private 
good assumes a form such as (X) U^(X). The axes are the same as in 
^Adapted from W.H. Oakland "Joint Goods" op. cit. 
Figure 2-5. The ease is now considered of a good which lies between 
the purely piiblic and the private good in the sense that it not only 
provides for joint consumptionj but also has the characteristic that 
an increase in one man's consumption implies a reduction in some 
other individual*s consumption, 
e.g. fire protection. 
The utility possibility frontier for fire protection would look 
like U^(X) B C ip-iX) in Figure 6A'l. As with the purely public good 
(the frontier for which is represented by point A)y this curve lies 
everywhere to the north-east of the frontier for private goods; but 
unlike the purely public good it has^ in some range, a negative and 
finite slope. The important difference between the utility frontier 
for impure public goods and those for private and purely public goods, 
is not the relative position of the three curves. What matters is 
that the good should be such as to give rise to a frontier which 
a) is not coincident with the frontier for a private good, and 
b) has a negative slope over some range. 
With such goods, problems arise because of external economies 
(or diseconomies in the case of public bads) associated with the pro-
duction or consumption of the goods. Head draws attention to the 
importance of making a sharp distinction between private and social 
marginal costs, benefits and products.^ Private economic units. 
^J.G. Head, "The Welfare Foundations of Public Finance Theory," 
op. cit., p. 18. 
Utility Possibility Frontier for an Impure Public 
Good 
F I G 6A-\ 
B 
through ordinary private pricing, are unahle to charge consumers 
for the full social benefits arising from their activities. He 
emphasises that, 
.... the market requirements for a Pareto optimum must 
now be interpreted strictly in terms of the relevant social 
magnitudes. Since competitive markets can only establish 
the corresponding private relationships^ the correction of 
the resulting disturbances to the optimum conditions must 
be regarded as another legitimate economic function of 
government .... It is often said that the output of goods 
exhibiting external economies should be encouraged^ whilst 
that of goods exhibiting external diseconomies should be 
discouraged. ̂  
The point of all this is to demonstrate that market failure 
can range from virtual collapse in the polar case, through serious 
and significant (in cases like public health and education)3 to the 
more marginal cases. In the latter case^ even though private 
suppliers may provide substantial quantities of the goods^ the 
externalities involved imply that this supply will fall short of an 
optimal level. Possible examples might be medical care^ school text-
books etc. 
^Ibid. 3 p. 28. 
^J.G. Head^ "The Theory of Public Goods" op. cit. ^ p. 23. 
A Ranking of Fublio Goods 
Breton has attempted a static ordering of public goods accord-
n 
ing to a single space continuum. His arguments are of some 
releoance to this worky since they throw some light on the "public-
ness" of the goods with which the thesis is concerned. They also 
highlight some of the problems inherent in allocating functions to 
the various levels of government. 
He assumes that many non-private goods are similar in the degree 
of publioness they possess so that clusters of such goods are formed. 
The clusters so grouped^ are labelled in descending order of public-
ness. 
i.e. international goods, continental goods, national goods, regional 
goods, provincial goods, metropolitan goods, municipal and local 
goods. 
The same system of classification is used to categorise various 
levels of government, each of which is assumed to have different 
powers of jurisdiction. 
i.e. international or world government, continental government etc. 
The conclusions he reaches depend upon a number of initial assumptions. 
^A. Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants" Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science. XXXI No. 2 (May, 1965) 175-185. 
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perhaps the most important of which is that the true preferences of 
individual members of society are known. 
The utility function of a given individual contains^ for example^ 
international goods, national goodsy provincial goods, local goods 
and private goods. The local goods he shares with members of his 
localityy the provincial goods with members of his province and so on. 
Every individual has such a utility function. 
In addition to this set of utility functions, Breton supposes a 
transformation function which defines the real resource cost of pro-
ducing one type of good expressed in terms of the opportunity cost 
of other goods in the function. If the utility functions acre max-
imised subject to the transformation constraint, a set of necessary 
equilibrium conditions will be defined. 
TABLE 










Table BA-^l represents the budget of an individual consumer. Since 
o o 
X^^ and X^^ are private goodsy the amount of private goods available 
o o o 
to Other consumers is decreased by this amount. With X ^ ^ and X^^ o y jiu 
iHd. 
this is not the oase^ since these goods are purely public for all 
members of the locality. 
i.e. The goods are available in equal quantities to everyone. But 
because these goods are consumed within the consumer's locality^ there 
is less available of these goods for members of other localities. The 
same procedure is followed for other goods in the consumer's budget. 
2. A Pareto Optimal Allocation of Resources 
Breton conceives of an economically optimal constitution^ con-
taining pure public local goods^ pure public national goods etc. 
This could lead to a perfect mapping such that all the objective 
benefits of local goods are exhausted within the boundaries of the 
local jurisdiction and so on. Provided the non-private goods are 
paid for by benefit taxes (i.e. according to each individual's marginal 
evaluation of each good^ and the prices of private goods are set by a 
mechanism which correctly reflects the preferences of members of society 
and the scarcity of resources in that society)^ then an optimm con-
stitution yields an allocation of resources which is Pareto optimal. 
With an economically optimal constitution^ this outcome is still 
possible even if public goods are paid for by non-benefit taxes (such 
as proportional income tax). But to achieve this resulty neutral taxes 
must be collected from individuals whose tax rates are smaller than the 
marginal utility they derive from public goods. The revenue thus raised 
must he transferred to those individuals for whom tax rates exceed 
the marginal satisfaction from public goods. 
Possible outcomes from various situations of imperfect mapping 
are then considered. Pareto optimal solutions are still possible 
providing a higher level government which can compute the marginal 
costs and benefits of spill-overs makes grants available. If there 
are spill-overs resulting from the nature of public goods, conditional 
government grants may yield a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, 
providing benefit taxation exists. If non-benefit taxation exists, 
additional unconditional grants will be required* 
Implications of Breton's model 
It would seem that there are a number of important implications 
for this thesis arising from Breton's model* These are outlined 
below: 
a) If it is assumed that certain goods produced by local government 
authorities produce spill-overs to other communities, then conditional 
grants from a higher level of government (e.g. state government) are 
necessary for a situation of Pareto optimal allocation of resources 
to be attained. The method of revenue raising employed by these 
authorities requires that these conditional grants must be supplemented 
by unconditional grants if this outcome is to occur. But the achieve-
ment of Pareto optmality depends upon the ability of the higher level 
authority to aeaurately compute benefits and oasts arising from the 
production of these goods, so that the problem has only a oonoeptual 
solution. Nevertheless, it is a potent argument in favour of a multi-
level system of government. 
b) It has been argued that before any governmental activity is 
allocated to the local level, then it must be shown that the activity 
Q 
can be performed efficiently on a local scale. But Breton points out 
that if governmental jurisdictions are tailored to f i t the extension 
of benefits of non-private goods to produee an optimum constitution, 
then in some cases the jurisdictions will be too small to create a 
government that would be of efficient size. 
Therefore, if ward aldermen insist that their wards have the same 
facilities as all others, then an inefficient outcome may occur. 
Consider the case of two adjoining wards within a particular community. 
The residents of both wards may wish for a cultural centre. Because 
the wards are compact, the benefits of each cultural centre would for 
all practical purposes be equally available to all residents. 
However, by building one somewhat larger facility to serve both 
wards, certain economies of scale may be achieved, even though the 
^G.J. Stigler, "The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government" 
Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability^ \iashingtom 
U.S. G.P.O. 213-219. 
benefits will no longer he equally aoailable to all, since some 
residents will be involved in travelling greater distances. Breton's 
point may thus be interpreted as meaning that it may be worthwhile in 
some cases to create externalities between locality (wards) in order 
to achieve economies of scale. Similarly^ it is an argument for a 
number of municipalities co-operating to jointly finance the provision 
of a facility which provides benefits to the residents of all partic-
ipating areas. 
4. An Economic Theory of Clubs 
Buchanan's "Economic Theory of Clubs'* also has some important 
implicationsy and provides a further means of classifying goods accord-
ing to their degree of publicness.^^ He points out that there is an 
optimal membership for almost any activity. 
e.g. For a private good, the optimal sharing arrangement or club size 
is one person or one family unit. At the other extreme^ the optimal 
size for a purely public good is an infinitely large number. 
Thus, for goods with some degree of "publicness", the optimal 
sharing group is greater than one but less than an infinitely large 
number. Buchanan presents both an algebraic and a geometric version 
^^James M. Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs" Economica 
XXXII, 1965, 1-14. 
of his analysis. It seems relevant to outline both versions in some 
detail because of the important implications which arise from his 
modaU 
An algebraic presentation 
If purely private goods and services only are assumed, then the 
utility function of an individual can be written as follows: 
(1) U^ ^ U^ a/, x/, xj') 
where each of the X's represents the amount of a purely private good 
available to the individual during a specified time. 
Purely public goods, denoted by the subscripts, n -h 1, , n -h m 
are added, so that (1) now reads, 
* * i i i i i i 
(2) U ^ U (X^ , X^ , , X^ , X^^^ , X^^^ , , X^^ ) . 
This is the approach adopted by Samuelson, involving the polar 
cases of a purely private and purely public good. Private goods, 
defined to be wholly divisible among the persons, i = 1, 2 , s, 
satisfy the relation 
« ® i 
Public goods, defined to be wholly indivisible as among persons, satisfy 
the relation 
Buchanan now includes in the utility frmotion goods falling 
between the extremes of purely private and purely public goods. 
Provided that the output of the good is fixed at a particular level, 
then the amount of the good that will he available to each individual 
will depend to a certain extent on the number of others with whom he 
shares. 
e.g. A's membership of a club which owns a tennis court may entitle 
him to one game of tennis per week. Providing that symmetrical 
sharing of the good is assumed, then doubling of the membership will 
mean that A will now be entitled only to one game every two weeks, 
i.e. The individuales utility for any such good is related to the size 
of the sharing group, so that a club size variable should be included 
for each good. Thus for each good, X ,, should be placed on N 
V Ü 
defined as "the number of persons who are to participate as members 
in the sharing of X". For private goods, the optimal size of N. is Ü tJ 
one; for purely public goods it will he an infinitely large number. 
The uHlity function can now be written 
(Z) é = u-" iv/;. — ( x j - , . 
A cost or production function, which will include the club size 
variables will also confront each individual. The number of members 
sharing the cost of providing a service will affect the cost of the good 
to any one member. 
i. e. The larger the membership^ the lower the dues to any single 
member, 
e.g. The greater the number of members admitted to the tennis club^ 
the lower will be the fees payable by each member. Thusy 
a/, a J , . ^ n . 
To define the necessary marginal conditions for utility maximis-
ationj Buchanan introduces a numeraire good, X^j which can be thought 
of as money. Lower case u's are used to represent the partial 
derivatives of the utility function and the numeraire good. Thus, 
i i Uj /u^ represents the marginal rate of substitution in consumption 




represents the marginal rate of substitution 
in consumption between the size of the sharing group and the numeraire, 
i.e. This ratio represents the rate at which the individual is willing 
to give up (or accept) money in exchange for additional members of the 
sharing group. 
• • • • ^ if ^ On the cost side, the ratios f . /f^ and f^. /f^ can be derived. 
In respect to the consumption of each good, the necessary marginal 
conditions for Pareto optimality in respect to consi4mption of each good 
can now be stated. 
(S) « / / « / = / / / / / • 
th 
Expressed verbally, for the i individual the marginal rate of 
substitution between goods X. and X in consumption^ must be equal 
J ^ 
to the marginal rate of substitution between the same goods in 
production ov exchange. 
Buchanan adds a further condition 
This means that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
between the size of the group sharing in the use of good Xand the 
tJ 
numeraire good, X^, must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution 
in production* 
i. e. An individual will regard club size as being optimal when the 
marginal benefits (usually negative) which he secures from having an 
additional member are just equal to the marginal costs that he incurs 
(again usually negative) for adding a member. 
When (5) and (6) are combined, the necessary marginal conditions 
with respect to the consumption-utilisation of X, are satisfied. 0 
Under these conditions, the individual has available to his 
membership unit an optimal quantity of X, measured in physical units, 
and this quantity is shared optimally over a group of determined size. 
Once equation (7) has been established, it provides a simple measure 
of the degree of "publicness" possessed by a good, as goods may be 
classified according to the equilibrium values of N 
V 
i.e. A good for which the equilihriwn value of N is large^ can he 
classified as containing much "publicness". Conversely^ a good for 
which the equilihriwn value of N, is small can he classified as 
d 
largely private. 
An alternative geometric analysis 
Buchanan supplements the formal analysis above with a geometrical 
treatment. In Figure 6A'2, total cost and total benefit per person 
are measured on the vertical axis. Total benefit is derived from the 
individual*s assessment of the facility and is expressed in money 
terms. On the horizontal axis the number of persons in possible 
sharing arrangements is measured. At this stage one unit of the 
facility only is considered, 
e.g. A single swomming pool. 
A total benefit function, B^, and total cost function, C^, are 
first traced in Figure eA-S. After some point, the individual's 
benefit evaluation will decline. This will usually occur once con-
gestion sets in. It is also equally obvious that it may initially rise, 
e.g. A tennis court would not benefit a single individual to the same 
extent that it would benefit four people. 
But as more and more members are accepted into the sharing arrange-
ments, an individual's total evaluation of the benefits he receives 
from membership of the tennis club begins to decline. 
Determination of Optimal Size of a Sharing Group 
FIG bA-1 
Y. 
WUMBif? OF PERSONS 
Bringing into the club additional members has the effect of 
reducing the cost that each person faces. The curve C^ in Figure 6A-2 
assumes syrmetrical cost sharing, although similar conclusions would 
be reached under most sharing schemes. There will exist some optimal 
size of club for a given size of the facility. This size is repres-
ented by point S^, where the derivatives of the total cost and total 
benefit functions are equal (where total benefits exceed total costs 
by the greatest sum. ) 
If the size of the facility is increased, new cost and benefit 
functions Ch and Bh can be derived, and another optimum club size, 
Sh is established. For every possible size of facility, an optimum 
sharing size can be specified using similar constructions. 
Buchanan uses a similar construction to determine optimal goods 
quantity for every possible size of club. In Figure 6A-S, total costs 
and total benefits confronting the individual ore measured on the 
vertical axis, while physical size of the facility (quantity of the 
good) is measured on the horizontal axis. For each size of club 
membership total cost and total benefit functions may be traced. As 
more people are added to the sharing group, then total costs to the 
single person fall, so that cost functions will move downwards to the 
right as club size is increased. 
Veterrmnation of Optimal Size of a Fuhlia Good 
FIG 6 4 - 3 
QL/ANTITY OF GOOD 
Similarly^ benefit functions will generally shift downward 
beyond the initial non congestion stage. An optimal goods quantity 
for each size of club can be derived. QK is such a quantity for 
club size N = K, 
Buchanan then combines the results obtained from Figures 6A-2 
and 6A-Z, Goods quantity and club size are measured on the ordinate 
and abscissa respectively. The aurvey N opt, in Figure 6A-4 is 
derived from the values for optimal club size for each goods quantity 
values for optimal goods quantity for each club size in Figure 6A-3, 
Only at point G^ the intersection of N opt, and Q opt, is the 
individual in equilibrium with respect to both goods quantity and 
group size, If^ for example^ the sharing group is limited to NKj the 
attainment of equilibrium with respect to goods quantityy shown by QK^ 
would still leca^e the individual desirous of shifting the size of 
membership so as to attain position L, As group size increases^ the 
individual prefers a larger quantity of the goody and so on^ until G 
is attained. 
At point Gy the necessary marginal conditions outlined in equation 
(7) are satisfiedy although Buchanan points out that an oversimplific-
ation is involvedy as the geometrical construction implies that the 
necessary marginal conditions are satisfied at unique equilibrium values 
for both goods quantity and club sizey when in facty the final "solution" 
can be located on a sub-infinity of points on the Pareto welfare surface. 
Determination of Optimal Size of Fuhlic Good 
and Size of Sharping Group 





Implioations of Buchanan*s model 
If the definition of a club group size is extended to embrace a 
group size such as would exist in a local government area^ and if it 
was possible to obtain the data necessary to solve the relevant 
equations for a particular individual^ then that person would be able 
to specify: 
(i) The optimal size of the population of a particular local govern-
ment area which carries out a given set of functions. 
i.e. Provides a given set of facilities. 
(ii) The functions that should he allocated to each local government 
area. 
e.g. If the optimal size of the sharing group for a facility exceeds 
the population of the municipality^ then the expenditure function 
should he the responsibility of a higher level of government. 
In addition, the individual would he able to say something about -
(i) Where ward boundaries should he drawn. If, as suggested in 
Chapter VI, each ward strives to have the full set of facilities 
available to all other wards, then each ward should he of a size to he 
able to enjoy optimal benefits from each facility. But since the optimal 
size of the sharing group will vary with the facility, then a compromise 
must he made. Something more definite may he determined if decision 
makers decide to provide each ward with a particular standard sized 
fad lity. 
e.g. An Olympic swimming pool. 
It may then he neoessary to tailor the size of wards so that 
the populations contained therein are optimal with regard to some 
of these very major items of expenditure. 
(ii) The scale of public works carried out in various wards. Take 
for example the situation in the City of \iollongong. A public 
swimming pool built in the geographical centre of Ward 4 would be 
11 
located in central ^iarrawong. Residents of Ward 4 who live in an 
isolated area such as Windang would receive little benefit from the 
poolj because of the travelling distance involved. Because the 
residents of Ward 4 are dispersed over a large area, small scale public 
works may be preferable. On the other handy in a more compact elect-
orate such as Ward more sizeable programmes of public works would 
be desirable. 
The two models presented in this appendix do not relate directly 
to basic question with which the thesis is concerned^ but both seem 
to have sufficient relevance to be worthy of inclusion. 
^^See Tlate 1. 
APPEWIX B 
WLLOmom MUNICIPAL SERVICES SURVEY 
Subject's Address: 
Question 1: 
Country of Origin of Head of Family? 
Question 2: 
If you were bom in another country^ how long have you lived in 
Australia? 
Question 3: 
Age of head of family? (Insert an X in the appropriate box) 
21-26 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 
46-50 51-55 56-60 60-65 65 plus 
Question 4: 




Age of childpen, if appliaable? 
Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 




Child 7 Child 8 
Question 7: 
Are you a ratepayer? 
Instructions for Question 8 
Out of each $100 of ratepayer*s money spent on certain municipal 
services^ Wollongong Council spends the following amounts on the 
services listed. You are asked to indicate hew much of the $100 you 
would like Council to spend on each service. Four types of response 
are possible. 
a) If you agree with Council's plans, fill in Column B with the same 
amounts shown in Column A. 
h) If the rate charged by Council is acceptable to you, but you would 
like to see more spending on some items and less on others, then the 
amounts you enter in Column B for some (or all) services will differ 
from those in Column A^ hut the total must still he $100. 
Q) If you are loilling to pay more in rates so that more can he spent 
on some or all services then your total in Column B will he greater 
than $100. 
Each dollar hy which your total in Column B exceeds $100 means that 
you would he willing to accept an increase of 30<f per year in the 
amount paid hy the average ratepayer. 
d) If you prefer to pay less in rates and would therefore prefer 
Council to reduce spending on some or all services^ then your total 
in Column B will he less than $100. 
Each dollar hy which your total in Column B is less than $100 means 
that you wish Council to decrease hy ZO<r per year the amount paid hy 
the average ratepayer. 
Question 8: 
Services Column A Column B 
1. Roadsy streets, kerhing and guttering $65.50 
2. Senior Citizen's Centres 0.50 
Z. Swimming Pools 7»50 
4. Town Planning 1*50 
5. Library Services 7.50 
e. Child Minding Centres 0.50 
7. Parks and Gardens 9.00 
8. Street Lighting 7.00 
9. Bahy Health Centres 1.00 
Total $100.00 
Question 9: 
It has been suggested by some people that Councils should move 
further into the field of social welfare. Insert an X in the approp-
riate box or boxes if you would approve of Council spending rate-
payer's money for the following purposes: 
To provide Cultural Centres^ e.g. (Theatres, auditoriums, 
art galleries). 
To provide Youth Centres. 
To purchase land to be subdivided by Council and sold to 
citizens who wish to construct homes. 
Question 10: ONLY TO BE ANSWERED IF YOU PLACED AN X IN ANY BOX IN 
QUESTION 9. 
How would you like Council to finance the spending on these extra 
items? Insert an X in the appropriate box. 
a) 
b) 
By increasing rates. 
By reducing spending on existing municipal services. 
Question 11: ONLY TO BE ANSWERED IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER 10(h). 
Insert an X next to those services on which you would like 
spending to be reduced so that money would he available to pay for 
the additional services you would like Council to provide. 
(From Question 9). 
Roads^ streets^ kerhing and guttering. 




Child Minding Centres. 
Parks and Gardens. 
Street Lighting. 
Baby Health Centres. 
Question 12: 
In making your decision to live in the Wollongong Municipality^ 
how important to you was the range and quality of services offered 
by Wollongong Council and the rates that you must pay to enjoy these? 
Insert an X in the appropriate box. 
Of no importance. 
Of little importance. 
Important. 
Very Important, 
The most important factor. 
Question 13: 
Do you own a motor car? 
Question 14: 
Do you intend to stay in the Wollongong Municipality for the next few 
years? 
APPENDIX C 
SHELLHARBOUR MUNICIPAL SERVICES SURVEY 
Subject's Address: 
Question 1: 
Country of Origin of Head of Family? 
Question 2: 
If you were bom in another countryy in what year did you arrive in 
Australia? 
Question 3: 
Age of head of family? (Insert an X in the appropriate box) 
21''25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 
46-50 51-55 56-60 60-65 65 plus 
Question 4: 
Married or Single? (Insert an X in the appropriate box) 
Married Single 
Question 5: 
Age of children, if applicable? 
Child 1 Child 2 Child Z Child 4 




Are you a ratepayer? 
Child 7 Child 8 
Instructions for Question 8 
Out of each $100 of ratepayer's money spent on certain municipal 
services, Shellharbour Council spends the following amounts on the 
services listed. You are ashed to indicate how much of the $100 you 
would like Council to spend on each service. Four types of response 
are possible. 
a) If you agree with Council's plans, fill in Column B with the same 
amounts shown in Column A. 
b) If the rate charged by Council is acceptable to you, but you would 
like to see more spending on some items and less on others, then the 
amounts you enter in Column B for some (or all) services will differ 
from those in Colum A, hut the total must still he $100. 
o) If you ca*e willing to pay move in rates so that more can he spent 
on some or all services then your total in Colwm B will he greater 
than $100. 
Each dollar hy which your total in Colwm B exceeds $100 means that 
you would he willing to accept an increase of 9<f per year in the 
amount paid by lMe a:oeraQe ratepayer. 
d) If you prefer to pay less in rates and would therefore prefer 
Council to reduce spending on some or all services^ then your total 
in Column B will he less than $100. 
Each dollar hy which your total in Column B is less than $100 means 
that you wish Council to decrease hy per year the amount paid hy 
the average ratepayer. 
Question 8: 
Column B Services Colwm A 
1. Roads, streets, kerhing and guttering $63. 50 
2. Senior Citizen^s Centres Nil 
Z. Swirming Pools 7.00 
4. Town Planning 6.00 
5. Library Services 1.60 
6. Child Minding Centres Nil 
7. Parks and Gardens 9.00 
8. Street Lighting 11.50 
9. Baby Health Centres 1.50 
Total $100.00 
Question 9: 
It has been suggested by some people that Councils should move 
further into the field of social welfare. Insert an X in the approp-
riate box or boxes if you would approve of Council spending rate-
payer's money for the following purposes: 
To provide Cultural Centres, e.g. (Theatres, auditoriums, 
art galleries). 
To provide Youth Centres. 
To purchase land to he subdivided by Council and sold to 
citizens who wish to construct homes. 
Question 10: ONLY TO BE ANSWERED IF YOU PLACED AN X IN ANY BOX IN 
QUESTION 9. 
How would you like Council to finance the spending on these extra 
items? Insert an X in the appropriate box. 
a) 
b) 
By increasing rates. 
By reducing spending on existing municipal services. 
Question 11: ONLY TO BE ANSWERED IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER 10(b). 
Insert an X next to those services on which you would like 
spending to be reduced so that money would be available to -pay for 
the additional services you would like Council to provide, 
(From Question 9), 
Roads, streets, kerbing and guttering. 




Child Minding Centres. 
Parks and Gardens. 
Street Lighting. 
Baby Health Centres. 
Question 12: 
In making your decision to live in the Shellharhour Municipality, 
how important to you was the range and quality of seroices offered 
by Shellharbour Council and the rates that you must pay to enjoy these? 
Insert an X in the appropriate box. 
Of no importance. 
Of little importance. 
Important, 
Very Important* 
The most important factor 
Question 13: 
Do you own a motor car? 
Question 14: 
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